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The United States Congress recently authorized the appointment of
a Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of
Appeals. 1 That entity has an historic opportunity to analyze carefully
the federal appellate system and make valuable suggestions for
improvement, thereby charting the destiny of the intermediate appeals
courts for the twenty-first century. The creation of this new commission
is important because now is a critical time for the appellate courts. All
twelve regional circuits have experienced exponential docket growth but
have possessed insufficient resources to treat the cases: this crisis of
volume now seriously threatens the system.
The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System
(Hruska Commission), which completed its work2 a quarter century ago,
performed the last assessment that thoroughly scrutinized the appeals
courts and enjoyed national recognition and respect. The timing of the
Hruska Commission study was significant, as the early 1970s was the
period when the regional circuits first began to encounter the dramatic
rise in appeals that transformed the courts over the course of a
generation.3 Because there is a crucial need to explore the appellate
courts' condition and means of improving those circumstances, the

1. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 305, 111 Stat 2440, 2491-92 (1997).
2. See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COUIIT APPELLATE SYSTEM, THE
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinafter HRUSKA COMMISSION).

3. See id. at 227.
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recently-authorized study deserves analysis. This Article undertakes that
effort.
The Article initially considers the developments that led Congress to
approve a new commission. The background is particularly significant
because assessment of the mandate that Congress assigned the entity
suggests that the charge is unclear, very general, and amenable to
multiple plausible interpretations. The convoluted and complex-if not
arcane-legislative process that yielded the authorizing statute additionally frustrates understanding. For example, a House-Senate Conference
Committee adopted the study measure as a substitute for an appropriations rider that would have divided the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit.4 The commission, therefore, was ultimately the
product of congressional machinations which had quite different
purposes and of lengthy, controversial negotiations among senators and
representatives who held extraordinarily diverse views.
These propositions mean that Congress effectively left significant
features of the entity's evaluation and its recommendations to the
discretion of commission members and their staff. For instance, the
authorizing legislation requires that the entity focus on the Ninth Circuit,
but it is unclear how much emphasis this court should receive.5
Moreover, the commission and the staff must expeditiously resolve these
issues, so that the entity can discharge its daunting assignment in the
exceedingly short compass afforded. The Article accordingly probes the
events that preceded adoption of the study commission statute to
ascertain precisely what Congress intended. This inquiry proves
somewhat inconclusive, although it _is possible to extract certain ideas
from the relevant legislative history.
The Article concludes with recommendations for conducting the
study. Because all of the appeals courts have experienced burgeoning
dockets over the last quarter-century and have developed a broad
spectrum of measures for treating them, the entire system warrants
comprehensive analysis. The finest solutions for the problems that every
appellate court confronts can only be crafted after the commission
systemically collects, assesses and synthesizes the maximum relevant
empirical data on increasing appeals and mechanisms for addressing
caseload growth. Once the entity has compiled and consulted the largest
quantity of accurate information, it should be possible to identify the
best remedies for the difficulties that the regional circuits will face in
the twenty-first century.

4. See infra text accompanying notes 162-63.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 166-76.
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I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL
STUDY COMMISSION

The origins and development of the recently-authorized national
commission to study the appeals courts deserve comprehensive treatment
in this Article, although certain aspects of the history have been
examined elsewhere.6 Relatively thorough evaluation of the relevant
background is justified because this type of assessment should increase
understanding of the national study approved by Congress.
A. General Background 7
Congress implemented the modern appellate system by adopting the
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, which was popularly known as
the Evarts Act.8 Congress subsequently established two new appeals
courts while reconfiguring the boundaries of two appellate courts.9 In
1948, Congress formally added the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit,10 which primarily hears appeals of
federal administrative agency decisions. 11 In 1982, Congress created the
Federal Circuit and afforded the court national jurisdiction over cases

6. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to
Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit Is Not Such a Good Idea, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 917, 918-23 (1990) (providing a brief overview of changes in federal circuit court
boundaries from 1789 to 1982); Carl Tobias, An Analysis of Federal Appellate Court Study
Commissions, 74 DENVER U. L. REV. 65, 65-69 (1996) (reviewing the activities of the 104th
Congress "relative to the possible division of the Ninth Circuit"); see also NINTH CIRCUIT
COUIIT OF APPEALS REoRGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, s. REP. No. 197, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
7. I rely in this subsection on Carl Tobias, The Impoverished Idea of Circuit-Splitting,
44 EMORY L.J. 1357 (1995).
8. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49
(1994)). See generally FELIX FRANKFUIITER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE
SUPREME COUIIT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-27 (1927) (describing the
successes and failures of the Evarts Act in preparing the federal judiciary for "an era which
transformed the whole political and legal picture of the United States").
9. See Baker, supra note 6, at 921-22; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1360.
10. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 869, 870 (current version at 28
u.s.c. § 41 (1994)).
11. See Colloquy, The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN.
L. REV. 507, 509 (1988) (describing the District of Columbia Circuit as "de facto, an
administrative law court"); Spottswood W. Robinson, ill, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of Change,
55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 715, 715 (1987); see also Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of
Columbia Circuit: literally and Figuratively Halfway Between the Capitol and the White House,
72 MINN. L. REV. l, l, 4 (1987) (describing the importance of separation of powers issues in
cases before the District of Columbia Circuit).
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that primarily implicate customs, patents, trademarks, copyrights, and
claims against the United States. 12
During 1929, Congress established the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals by removing Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah,
and Wyoming from the Eighth Circuit and leaving Arkansas, Iowa,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota in that
court. 13 Docket congestion in the Eighth Circuit prompted Congress to
form the new appeals court.14
Growing caseloads only became a systemic problem after the midtwentieth century, however. Congress has vastly expanded federal court
jurisdiction since that time. It has created numerous new civil actions
and many additional crimes which, for example, fostered a 200 percent
annual increase in appeals during the last two decades. 15 Congress did
authorize many additional appellate court judgeships, but too few to
resolve the substantial number of increasingly complex civil and
criminal appeals that parties pursued. 16 All of the regional circuits have
responded to burgeoning caseloads principally by imposing limitations
on the number of written opinions that the appellate courts issue and
oral arguments that they grant and by relying substantially on support
staff. 17
It is important to understand that-there is significant variation among
the twelve regional circuits. All of the courts have experienced
expanding dockets, although they have done so at different times, and
at diverse rates. The circuit courts also have had varying resources,
especially judges, to treat the rising appeals. They have employed
various measures to address the mounting caseloads.

12. See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 101, 96 Stat 25 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study
in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) (analyzing the patent jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit); Symposium, United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Tenth
Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559-1074 (1992).
13. See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 41 (1994)).
14. See Baker, supra note 6, at 923. See generally Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell,
The Political and Administrative History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, 60 DENY. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983).
15. See COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, H.R.

REP. No. 26, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1997) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 34(d) (imposing time limits on oral arguments); 9TH CIR. R. 36
(limiting publication of dispositions to orders); Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate
Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937, 938-41 (1980) (describing
the use of support staff); see also Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the
Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268 (1996) (analyzing regional circuits' responses).
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Concerns about these dockets, which numerous federal judges voiced
led Congress to create the Hruska Commission in 1972.18 After the
entity conducted a comprehensive assessment of the appellate courts, it
recommended that Congress divide the two largest circuits, the Fifth and
the Ninth, rather than advocating a more thoroughgoing remedy, such
as realignment of all of the appeals courts' boundaries. 19 The Commission expressed reluctance to disrupt institutions that had secured the
loyalty and respect of their constituents and to disturb the sense of
community apparently enjoyed by judges and lawyers within the existing
appeals courts.20
The Hruska Commission premised its suggestion that Congress split
the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on general standards relating to reconfiguration.21 Congress created the Eleventh Circuit by removing Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia from the Fifth Circuit and leaving the Canal Zone,
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in that court.22 Congress divided the
Fifth Circuit because of its magnitude in terms of geography, population,
dockets, and judgeships and because the active judges of the court
agreed on bifurcation.23 The Commission's recommendation that
Congress split California and reassign its district courts to different
circuits was not foreseen and proved very controversial. The proposal
delayed serious legislative examination of the Ninth Circuit's division
at the time. 24
Several extra-governmental agencies, such as the American Bar
Association (ABA), undertook studies of the appellate courts after the
Hruska Commission had completed its work. 25 In 1988, Congress
18. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 227; see also Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1973). The Judicial Conference Long Range Planning Committee
needed four years to compile a long range plan, but it resembled the Hruska Commission more
than the new study.
19. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 228.
20. See id.
21. The standards provided that: (1) at least three states should constitute circuits; (2)
appeals courts should not be established that would immediately require more than nine judges;
(3) circuits ought to include states which have diverse populations, legal business and socioeconomic interests; (4) realignment should not unduly interfere with existing appellate court
boundaries; and (5) appeals courts should consist of contiguous states. See id. at 231-32.
22. Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 41 (1994)). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236; Baker, supra note 6, at 925-28.
23. See Baker, supra note 6, at 927.
24. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 234-35. See generally Arthur D. Hellman,
Legal Problems ofDividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188
(1974).
25. See, e.g., Frank A. Kaufman et al., Report of the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, The United States Courts of Appeals:
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authorized the Federal Courts Study Committee, an independent entity
comprised of distinguished members of Congress, judges and attorneys,
to analyze the federal courts and afford recommendations for their
improvement.26 The Committee found that the appeals courts were
experiencing a "crisis of volume" that had transformed them over the
preceding quarter-century.27 It predicted that "more fundamental
change" appeared inevitable, barring reduced appellate workloads, a
possibility that seemed remote. 28 The Committee's report assessed five
basic structural alternatives for treating docket growth. 29 It endorsed
none of them, but discussed the options to foster future inquiry and
debate among the legislative, judicial and executive branches and
attorneys.30 The Committee proposed that Congress authorize a fiveyear evaluation of the appeals courts' caseloads and structural measures
for responding to them. Senators and representatives, however, did not
prescribe the recommended study.31
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) concluded a 1993 examination of
structural mechanisms at the instigation of the Committee and Congress.32 The Center ascertained that the appeals courts were experiencing stress that structural modifications could not significantly relieve. 33
The Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States completed a relatively thorough assessment of the federal
courts and issued a final report in December 1995.34 The Committee
rather strongly opposed reconfiguring appeals courts: instead, it explored
the prospects of assigning district court judges additional appellate
responsibilities and decreasing the size of appeals court panels.35

Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, reprinted in 125 F.R.D. 523,
542-44 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report] (discussing the problem of intracircuit conflicts). See
generally THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1994).
26. See REPORr OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITIEE (1990); see also Federal
Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-103, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988).
27. See REPORr OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 109.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 116-23.
30. See id.
31. See id. at 116.
32. See JUDITH A. MCKENNA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCIURAL AND OTHER
ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURI'S OF APPEALS (1993).
33. See id. at 155.
34. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURI'S (1995) [hereinafter LoNG RANGE PLAN].
35. See id. at 43-45.
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B. Ninth Circuit
Recent activity in the Senate and the House of Representatives
relating to proposals for bifurcating the Ninth Circuit deserve considerable discussion here, even though some dimensions of the relevant
background have received treatment elsewhere.36 Applicable developments principally implicating the Ninth Circuit require exploration
because they ultimately led to, and are inextricably intertwined with,
congressional authorization of a national study commission.
1. Earlier Proposals to Split the Ninth
Circuit and Ameliorative Efforts

Since before the Second World War, there have been a number of
suggestions to bifurcate the Ninth Circuit.37 The Hruska Commission's
recommendation that Congress divide the court was foreseeable, even
though its proposal that California be split and that the state's district
courts be reassigned to two appeals courts was not anticipated.38 The
entity's suggestion to bifurcate California provoked much controversy
and delayed contemporaneous legislative assessment of the court's
division. 39 Congress evinced little additional interest in a circuitsplitting bill that senators introduced during 1983.40
In 1978, Congress authorized appeals courts with more than fifteen
active judges to restructure the courts by using administrative units and
to prescribe streamlined processes for en bane proceedings.41 The Ninth
Circuit responded to this legislative invitation in several innovative
ways. For instance, the court reorganized into three units to secure more
decentralized and efficient administration.42 The circuit also promulgat-

36. See supra note 6.
37. See Baker, supra note 6, at 928; see also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE FOR THE
UNITED STATES COUIITS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PosmoN PAPER 1N OPPOSmON TO S.1686
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT (Aug. 2, 1991) [hereinafter s. 1686
PosmoN PAPER] (affording additional historical background).
38. See supra text accompanying note 24.
39. See id.
40. See S. 1156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); see also Baker, supra note 6, at 928; Faye
A. Silas, Circuit Breaker-Move on to Split the Ninth, 10 ABA J. 34, 34 (1984).
41. "Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into
administrative units .•• and may perform its en bane function by such number of members of
its en bane courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals." Act of Oct. 20, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented by Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981).
42. See Baker, supra note 6, at 929. See generally JOE s. CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE 1N A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (1985);
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT ExECUTIVE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, S. 948
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ed a local rule providing for a limited en bane procedure, whereby the
chief judge and ten active judges who are randomly chosen sit en bane
to rehear cases on a majority vote of all active judges.43
The court's judges have enhanced their productivity, and the circuit
has effectuated a number of internal reforms. For example, prebriefing
conferences narrow issues on appeal, restrict the size of briefs, and
explore settlement prospects.44 Circuit staff have become more efficient, and the court relies substantially on technological innovations.45
In 1989, the circuit reported to Congress that the instituted reforms had
enabled the court to resolve the system's largest docket efficaciously,
that there was no reason to bifurcate the circuit, and that the measures
employed even allowed the court to accommodate additional growth. 46
2. The 1990 Effort
Before 1995, Senate Bill 948 represented the "most credible effort"
to split the Ninth Circuit.47 Eight senators from states that the proposed
division would have affected co-sponsored the bill,48 and the United
States Department of Justice endorsed the measure. 49 During March

NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter s. 948
PosmON PAPER].
43. 9rn CIR. R. 35-3 (formerly Rule 25). See generally ABA Report, supra note 25, at
542-44 (intracircuit conflict is not alleviated by en bane decisions); PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET
AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 161-63, 200-03 (1976) (asserting that the efficiency of en bane review
declines as the number of judges increases); Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In
Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531 (1986).
44. See Baker, supra note 6, at 932; John B. Oakley, The Screening ofAppeals: The Ninth
Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859,
861, 875-903 (describing the Ninth Circuit's model for screening cases during a six and a half
year "study period"); see also CECIL, supra note 42, at 79-95 (explaining the Ninth Circuit's
prebriefing conference program); S. 948 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 42, at 6-7.
45. See Baker, supra note 6, at 932; Cathy Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 174-76 (1989) (reviewing the new computer programs used in the Ninth
Circuit); Hellman, supra note 17, at 940 (describing the Ninth Circuit's support staff); see also
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT ExECUTIVE OF IBE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PosmoN
PAPER IN 0PPOSmON TO S. 956--NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT
OF 1995 (June 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. S10436 (daily ed. July 10, 1995)
[hereinafter S. 956 PosmoN PAPER] (lauding court's experimentation).
46. THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINIB
CIRCUIT, FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IBE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6 OF
THE OMNIBUS JUDGESHIPS ACT OF 1978 AND 0rnER MEASURES TO IMPROVE IBE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1 (July 1989); see also s. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra
note 45, at 3-4 (finding court's experimentation has led others to follow its lead).
47. See Baker, supra note 6, at 932-33.
48. See 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989).
49. See Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Acting Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of
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1990, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative
Practice held a hearing at which many advocates and opponents of
circuit-splitting submitted much valuable information.50
At the 1989 meeting of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, the
entity adopted the official position that Congress should reject recommendations to divide the circuit, and ·most of the court's active judges
opposed bifurcation.st Proponents of the bill seemingly did not convince Congress to restructure the court, and critics of S. 948 apparently
responded in a persuasive manner to the contentions of the bill's
advocates.s2 The Judiciary Committee ultimately refused to approve the
measure.s3 The most significant reasons favoring and opposing S. 948
warrant little treatment here as they differ minimally from the rationales
that advocates have articulated since 1995.54
3. Activities of the 104th Congress
a. Circuit-Splitting Bills
In late May 1995, senators from Pacific Northwest states introduced
a bill that would have split the Ninth Circuit.ss This measure's introduction constituted the fourth effort to divide the appeals court in the
last thirteen years.56 The proposal would have included Alaska, Idaho,
Montana, Oregon, and Washington in a new Twelfth Circuit and would
have placed Arizona, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Guam, and the
Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit.s7 The proposed Twelfth
Circuit would have been assigned nine active judges and the new Ninth
Circuit would have had nineteen active members; Senate Bill 956
authorized no new judgeships.ss
Justice, to Sen. Howell Heflin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice 5 (Mar. 6,
1990), reprinted in Hearing on S. 948 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 571, 571 (1990) [hereinafter S. 948

Hearing].
50. See generally S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49.
51. See S. 1686 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 37, at 2. See generally S. 956 PosmoN
PAPER, supra note 45,.at 3.
52. See, e.g., S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49; Baker, supra note 6, at 934.
53. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 3; S. 1686 PosmON PAPER, supra note
37, at 2.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 55-80.
55. See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also S.853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) (providing earlier similar bill).
56. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1363-66; S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 2, 3.
57. See S. 956 § 2. See generally Baker, supra note 6, at 928-45; Tobias, supra note 7,
at 1363-75.
58. See S. 956 §§ 2, 5.
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During September of 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a
hearing on S. 956, and the Committee received much cogent testimony
and considerable additional information from champions and critics of
circuit-division.59 In a December Committee markup session, the
Judiciary Committee approved an amendment in the proposal as
introduced. The amendment would have left California, Hawaii, Guam
and the Northern Mariana Islands in the Ninth Circuit with fifteen
judges and would have placed Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana,
Nevada, Oregon and Washington, the remaining states of the existing
Ninth Circuit, in a new Twelfth Circuit with thirteen judges.6<>
The Senate and Committee members received and assessed numerous
well-considered ideas that favored and opposed splitting the Ninth
Circuit. Division's advocates stressed the problems which the circuit's
mammoth size has purportedly created.61 These encompassed the
court's gigantic geographic magnitude, the circuit's significant number
of judges (twenty-eight), the court's massive caseload, and the substantial expenses of operating the circuit.62
Opponents of the court's division countered the above arguments in
several ways. They claimed that the circuit has instituted reforms which
treat complications ascribed to size.63 For instance, over a decade ago,
the court established administrative units in Pasadena and Seattle where
appeals can be filed and orally argued, and the change has proved
responsive to the distances that counsel and litigants must travel. 64
Creation of the projected Twelfth Circuit would not have modified this
circumstance for many attorneys who now practice in the proposed
circuit. Critics also suggested that the court's magnitude affords benefits.
For example, it offers economies of scale, while large size provides
considerable diversity in terms of the complexity and novelty of cases
and in terms of judges' gender, race, political views and geographic
origins.65

59. See The Ninth Circuit Split: Hearing on S. 853 and S. 956 Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Hearings].
60. See Senate Judiciary Committee Markup of S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 8,
1995) [hereinafter S. 956 Markup]; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
61. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 60, at 12-13.
62. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S7504, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (daily ed. May 25, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Slade Gorton) [hereinafter Gorton Statement]; id. at S7505-06 (statement of
Sen. Conrad Bums) [hereinafter Bums Statement].
63. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
64. See Baker, supra note 6, at 929. See generally CECIL, supra note 42.
65. See, e.g., S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45; Steve Albert, Congress Weighs Plan
to Divide the 9th Circuit, LEGAL TlMES, Feb. 1, 1993, at 12, 13 (quoting former Chief Judge
James Browning's assertion that court's diversity is an asset).
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Another important contention of circuit-splitting's proponents was
that Ninth Circuit case law is inconsistent. The statistical possibilities for
conflicting opinions on a twenty-eight judge court seem significant
because 3276 combinations of three-judge panels could resolve an
issue.66 The Ninth Circuit Executive Office and experts who have
analyzed the circuit have found insufficient inconsistency to warrant
concern.67 The court has instituted measures to reduce conflicts. For
example, the circuit's staff attorneys fully review every appeal and code
into a computer the issues for resolution. 68 The court then assigns to
the same three-judge panel those cases which raise similar issues and are
ready for resolution at the same time.69
Another major argument of S. 956's advocates was that the court's
California judges, perspectives, and appeals have dominated the Pacific
Northwest.70 This contention partly reflected the champions' dissatisfaction with Ninth Circuit decisions in fields such as environmental law
and the death penalty.71 Some opponents of circuit-splitting responded
by maintaining that the preferable way to effect substantive changes in
the law is to convince Congress to alter it.72 Critics also challenged the
proponents' underlying premise that judges who were located in
California were monolithic and idiosyncratic.73 Assessment of the
judges' viewpoints and the computerized, random selection of threejudge panels rendered untenable any effort to stereotype the circuit's
California judges.74 Finally, critics observed that a majority of the
court's active judges were not even stationed in California.75
There are certain additional ideas that champions and critics
enunciated in support of and against the Ninth Circuit's division.
Opponents emphasized that the proposed Ninth Circuit would have had

66. See Baker, supra note 6, at 938.
67. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 4-5; see also infra text accompanying
notes 199-200. See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and
Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989) (reviewing
study of published opinions of the Ninth Circuit to determine if inconsistent decisions are a
problem).
68. See Hellman, supra note 17, at 944-45; see also UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT GENERAL ORDER 4.1 (1987).
69. See Hellman, supra note 17, at 957-58.
70. See, e.g., Gorton Statement, supra note 62, at S7504.
71. See, e.g., Burns Statement, supra note 62, at S7505; S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49,
at 284 (statement of Gov. Pete Wilson).
72. See, e.g., Daniel Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting 'California' Circuit, LEGAL
TIMEs, June 12, 1989, at 15 (quoting former Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin).
73. See Baker, supra note 6, at 940-41; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1372-73.
74. See Baker, supra note 6, at 941-42.
75. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 68.
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a significantly less beneficial ratio of three-judge panels to appeals than
the new Twelfth Circuit and a considerably less advantageous ratio than
the current Ninth Circuit.76 Projections indicated that panels of the
proposed Ninth Circuit would have annually faced 1014 appeals and
panels of the proposed Twelfth Circuit would have annually confronted
645 appeals, while panels of the existing Ninth Circuit address 868
appeals.77 Critics also argued that the proposed Twelfth Circuit would
have imposed much new administrative expense and would have
replicated functions that the Ninth Circuit now discharges satisfactorily. 78 Moreover, opponents claimed that most active members of the
court and many attorneys who practice before it opposed bifurcation.79
Proponents of circuit-splitting urged that judges on a smaller court,
such as the proposed Twelfth Circuit-which would have had nine
judges-would be more collegial, thereby enhancing efficiency. This
proposition had some validity; however, additional evidence suggested
that familiarity could have led to disadvantageous routinization, and in
certain situations might have fostered disagreement. 80 The circuit's
small size may concomitantly have sacrificed the benefits of diversity
and economies of scale that a bigger court offers.
On March 18, 1996, a few advocates of S. 956 attempted to have the
Senate consider the circuit-splitting measure as an amendment to federal
courts appropriations legislation.81 Critics of the bill sharply attacked
this effort on procedural grounds; however, senators participated in
much substantive debate over the ~ourt's division. 82 Proponents and
opponents ultimately agreed on a study commission proposal which
received strong bi-partisan support, and the Senate approved a commission on March 20.83 Upon receipt of the Senate measure, the House

76. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 6.
77. See id. at 5-6 (based on filings in 1994); see also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT ExECUTIVE
FOR THE U.S. COURfS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, PosmoN PAPER IN OPPOSmON TO s.
956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURf OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995 (1217/95) AND
COMPANION BILL H.R. 2935 (211196) 3 [hereinafter SECOND s. 956 PosmoN PAPER].
78. See S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 45, at 2-3.
79. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 5; SENATE REPORf, supra note
6, at 20-21; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1371.
80. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 159,
169-70 (1993) (describing the "reduced collegiality of the D.C. Circuit"). See generally FRANK
M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 213-29 (1994).
81. See 142 CONG. REC. S2219-2303, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1996)
(amendment no. 3530 proposed by Senator Burns).
82. See id.
83. See 142 CONG. REC. S2544, S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1996). The decision to leave
the court intact was advisable. Division would have been a limited reform and could have
precluded implementation of more effective solutions, such as realigning the existing regional
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assigned the proposal to the Judiciary Subcommittee on Intellectual
Property and Judicial Administration which Representative Carlos
Moorhead (R-Cal.) chaired. However, the House took no additional
action on the Senate proposal during the 104th Congress. Congress did
appropriate $500,000 for the commission's work but failed to pass
authorizing legislation.84
b. Commission Proposals
i. The Senate Proposal
The Senate proposal required that the commission "transmit its report
to the President and the Congress no later than February 28, 1997" and
that the Senate Judiciary Committee act within sixty days of the
document's transmittal.85 This measure differed somewhat from an
earlier study commission proposal providing a two-year period for the
work's completion and requiring no Judiciary Committee action on the
commission report, which Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.) had offered
as an amendment and which the Judiciary Committee narrowly rejected
during its December 7, 1995 markup.86
The time period that the March 21, 1996 proposal provided for the
commission to conclude its assessment may have been insufficient when
the Senate approved it. An informative yardstick for evaluating this
temporal consideration is the time which analogous study entities have
required to finish similar projects. The Federal Courts Study Committee
conducted the most recent analogous endeavor, and that entity took a
year and a half to conclude its work. 87 Some federal courts observers
found this time period inadequate and suggested that the temporal
limitation might have prevented the Study Committee from assembling
an even better report. 88 The Hruska Commission undertook another
similar analysis, and this group completed its study of the appeals courts
after eighteen months.89
Comparison of the March 21, 1996 Senate proposal with these prior,
analogous study commission efforts thus suggests that the measure

circuits or creating a third tier of appellate courts or more judgeships.
84. See 142 CONG. REC. Hl1644, H11859 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1996).
85. See 142 CONG. REC. S2545 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
86. See S. 956 Markup, supra note 60 (statement of Sen. Feinstein); see also SENATE
REPORI', supra note 6, at 19-20.
87. See supra note 26.
88. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1408; see also Telephone Interview with Arthur D.
Hellman, Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh (June 1, 1996).
89. See supra note 18.
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would have allotted too little time for the proposed commission to finish
the finest possible study. Legislative inaction, therefore, was probably
advisable. Congress should not have established a commission that
lacked adequate time to collect the most accurate data and to formulate
the best suggestions.
Rather similar difficulties involving scope also seemed to accompany
the proposed commission's mandated duties. The proposal provided that
the entity's functions were to:
(1) study the present division of the United States into the
several judicial circuits;
(2) study the structure and alignment of the Federal courts
of appeals with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit;
and
(3) report to the President and the Congress its recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries or structure
as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective
disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and
due process.90
The charge appeared overly narrow. For instance, the initial two
mandates required the commission to assess the country's present
division into several appeals courts and the structure and alignment of
the federal circuits "with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit"91 but
did not speak to increasing appeals, which are the major complication
that the appellate courts currently face. 92 The two strictures probably
could have been interpreted, however, to include docket growth.
The third command did specifically prescribe suggestions for
improvement that would lead to "expeditious and effective disposition"
of appeals.93 Nevertheless, those recommendations for alterations were
limited to "such changes in circuit boundaries or structure as may be
appropriate for" prompt and effective resolution.94 Confining commission consideration to structural alternatives may have been too narrow.
There are many other ways of treating the problems attributable to
mounting caseloads, which should not be described as structural.
90. See 142 CONG. REC. S2544, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
91. See id. Senator Feinstein's proposal was similar, but it did not include "with particular
reference to the Ninth Circuit" See S. 956 Markup, supra note 60 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
However, any national analysis of the appeals courts might well have emphasized this circuit.
92. See, e.g., REPOIIT OF THE FEDERAL COUIITS STUDY COMMITfEE, supra note 26, at
109.
93. See 142 CONG. REC. S2545, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996).
94. See id.
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Examples are increases in the number of judges authorized and
streamlining measures, such as those implemented by the Ninth Circuit,
which a number of appellate courts have instituted.95 Precluding
commission consideration of non-structural options might have been
unwise because it eliminated numerous apparently promising approaches. This circumstance was worsened because it was quite difficult to
ascertain which measures would have seemed most efficacious, until the
commission that was established had carefully assembled, assessed, and
synthesized the maximum applicable information.
ii. Additional Ninth Circuit-Specific Proposals
During the debate over the advisability of dividing the Ninth Circuit
and of passing S. 956, Governor Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) and Ninth Circuit
Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain offered separate proposals that would have
created a commission to study the court. Governor Wilson raised the
possibility in a letter he sent to Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Chair of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, on the eve of the December 1995
Committee markup. 96 Judge O'Scannlain mentioned the prospect during
his testimony in the September 1995 Judiciary Committee hearing.97
Governor Wilson wrote Senator Hatch to register his fervent
opposition to any division before the completion of an objective analysis
of whether bifurcation would treat effectively concerns regarding the
court's size.98 The governor observed that the assessment should
emphasize those questions aired about the Ninth Circuit and ascertain
whether the court should be split.99 By way of illustration, he stated
that "reform of our habeas corpus procedures and reforms which curb
frivolous inmate litigation may do more to address a growing caseload
than splitting the circuit."100 Governor Wilson urged that "a study be
commissioned to carefully examine the concerns raised about the Ninth
Circuit and determine whether the concerns are legitimate and whether

95. See, e.g., SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 27-28; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1363-64,
1405-07; see also infra text accompanying notes 229-302.
96. See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to Senator Orrin Hatch, Chair,
U.S. Senate Judiciary Comm. (Dec. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Wilson Letter].
97. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 59, at 71 (statement of Ninth Circuit Judge Diarmuid
O'Scannlain) reprinted in pertinent part in Diarmuid O'Scannlain, A Ninth Circuit Split ls
Inevitable, But Not Imminent, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 947, 947-50 (1995).
98. Wilson Letter, supra note 96.
99. Id.
100. Id. Governor Wilson was prescient The 104th Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
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a change in the circuit's boundaries is the best method of addressing
them." 101
Judge O'Scannlain proposed that Congress "direct the [C]ircuit
[J]udges of the [N]inth [C]ircuit to reflect over the next few years and
then to recommend, as did the judges of the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the 1980's, what the proper division of their circuit should
be." 102 He suggested that the Ninth Circuit judges' recommendation be
based on an analysis of those factors that would best enable the court
to fulfill its future goals. 103 The judge urged that any Ninth Circuit
reconfiguration ensure accountability to all individuals whom the court
now serves. 104 Judge O' Scannlain admonished champions of prompt
bifurcation that there had been "no recent systematic evaluation of
division of the [N]inth [C]ircuit ... since the Hruska Commission report
in the 1970's."105
4. Activities of the 105th Congress
The ongoing controversy over the Ninth.Circuit's possible division
led to the introduction of several legislative proposals for assessing the
federal appellate courts early in the first session of the 105th Congress.
When Congress convened during January 1997, Senators Dianne
Feinstein (D-Cal.) and Harry Reid (D-Nev.) introduced a bill that would
have authorized a national study of the appellate courts. 106 Soon
thereafter, and in apparent response, Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mont.)
and Representative Rick Hill (R-Mont.) introduced identical study
commission measures that differed somewhat from the bill introduced
by Senators Feinstein and Reid. 107 During March, Representative
Howard Coble (R-N.C.) and Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal.)

101. Wilson Letter, supra note 96.
102. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 59, at 71 (statement of Judge O'Scannlain); see also
Tobias, supra note 7, at 1361-62 (analyzing the Fifth Circuit).
103. See S. 956 Hearings, supra note 59, at 71 (statement of Judge O'Scannlain).
104. See id.
105. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 89 (mentioning the Hruska Commission).
The geographic scope of the analyses that the governor and the judge proposed was narrow. An
assessment that was confined to the Ninth Circuit would by definition have been incomplete.
The major difficulties that most circuits and the appellate system now face involve increasing
caseloads, and the problems are essentially systemic complications which will require systemic
treatment. A study limited to the Ninth Circuit, therefore, necessarily would not address all of
the difficulties being experienced and would yield only partial recommendations.
106. See S. 248, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997). The ideas in this paragraph and this
subsection are premised on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the
developments that occurred.
107. See S. 283, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); H.R. 639, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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introduced a proposal in the House that resembled the Feinstein-Reid
measure. The House subsequently modified the proposal somewhat. 108
In March, numerous senators who represented states in the Pacific
Northwest sponsored another piece of proposed legislation that would
have divided the Ninth Circuit. 109 The measure would have bifurcated
the court by placing Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon,
and Washington in a new Twelfth Circuit and by leaving California,
Hawaii, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands in the present Ninth
Circuit.
The Feinstein-Reid and Bums-Hill study bills, as introduced, were
similar in some ways but differed in certain important respects. The
Feinstein-Reid, Bums-Hill and Coble-Berman measures included the
same or analogous provisions for reimbursement, personnel, the
information which the commission can assemble, and congressional
consideration of the entity's suggestions. 110 The three proposals also
made identical prescriptions for some commission functions: to "study
the present division of the United States into the several judicial
circuits" and to "study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court
of Appeals system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit." 111
The second provision thus modified the approach that Senator Feinstein
followed in the 104th Congress because the 1997 bills added the word
"system," thereby clarifying and emphasizing the systemic nature of the
analysis prescribed. 112
The study proposals included a third function which differed. The
Feinstein-Reid and Coble-Berman measures required that the commission "report . . . its recommendations for such changes in circuit
boundaries or structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and
effective disposition of the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeals,
consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process." 113
The Bums-Hill proposal required the commission to "report recommendations to the President and Congress on appropriate changes in circuit
boundaries or structure for the expeditious and effective disposition of

108. See H.R. 908, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
109. See S. 431, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
110. Compare S. 248, §§ 3-5, 7 and H.R. 908, §§ 3-5, 7 with S. 283, §§ 3-5, 7 and H.R.
639, §§ 3-5, 7.
111. Compare S. 248, § l(b)(l)-(2) and H.R. 908, § l(b)(l)-(2) with S. 283, § l(b)(l)-(2)
and H.R. 639, § 1(b)(l)-(2).
112. Compare S. 248, § 1(b)(2); H.R. 908, § l(b)(2); S. 283, § l(b)(2) and H.R. 639, §
l(b)(2) with S. 956, § l(b)(2).
113. See S. 248, § l(b)(3); H.R. 908, § 1(b)(3).
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the caseload of the Federal Courts of Appeal, consistent with fundamental concepts of fairness and due process." 114
The measures prescribed rather dissimilar commission membership.
The Feinstein-Reid proposal called for twelve members and authorized
the President, the Chief Justice, the Senate Majority and Minority
Leaders, the House Speaker and the House Minority Leader to appoint
two members each. 115 The Coble-Berman bill provided for similar
composition but permitted the President and the Chief Justice to appoint
only one member apiece. 116 The Bums-Hill measure included eight
members and empowered the President and the Chief Justice to name
one member each and the Senate Majority Leader and the House
Speaker to appoint three apiece. 117
The proposals also differed as to the time provided for completion
of the evaluation. The Feinstein-Reid measure required the commission
to report "[n]o later than 2 years following the date on which its seventh
member is appointed." 118 The Coble-Berman approach commanded the
entity to report "no later than eighteen months following the date on
which its sixth member is appointed." 119 The Bums-Hill proposal
mandated that the commission report "[n]o later than 1 year after the
date of the enactment ... or June 30, 1998, whichever occurs first." 120
The approaches differed as well over the funding that Congress
would appropriate for completion of the study commission's work. The
Feinstein-Reid measure would have allocated $1,300,000121 and the
Coble-Berman bill would have allotted $900,000,122 while the BumsHill proposal would have authorized $500,000, which meant that no new
funding would need to be provided because the 104th Congress had
authorized this amount. 123
During March, the House Judiciary Subcommittee and Committee
promptly approved the Coble-Berman bill, which was scheduled for a
floor vote on March 18.124 However, members of the House, including
Representative Hill and Representative Don Young (R-Alaska), from the

114. See S. 283, § l(b)(3); H.R. 639, § l(b)(3).
115. See S. 248, § 2(a).
116. See H.R. 908, § 2(a).
117. See S. 283, § 2(a); H.R. 639, § 2(a).
118. See S. 248, § 6.
119. See H.R. 908, § 6.
120. See S. 283, § 6.
121. See S. 248, § 8.
122. See H.R. 908, § 8.
123. See S. 283, § 8; see also supra text accompanying note 84.
124. The ideas in this paragraph and the next and the rest of this subsection are premised
on conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the developments that occurred.
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Northwest prevented that vote because they differed with the CobleBerman approach and because a satisfactory compromise agreement on
a commission measure could not be reached.
Attention then focused on attempts to develop a compromise in the
Senate. Meetings between staff for Senators Bums and Feinstein led to
consensus in several areas as to which they had differed. They agreed
that the commission would have ten members, that the appointments
would be identical to those provided in the Feinstein-Reid measure,
except that the President and the Chief Justice would name one
individual each, and that the commission would have eighteen months
to finish its work.
On June 3, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 908 that
reflected numerous compromises struck by members of Congress in both
chambers. 125 This proposal included the original Feinstein-Reid
provision for the commission's third function and the Feinstein-Bums
compromise on the entity's membership, provided that the commission
would report eighteen months from the date of appointment of its sixth
member, and authorized $900,000 for the commission's work. 126 Upon
transmittal to the Senate, H.R. 908 remained at the desk and awaited
Senate action.
·
The legislative history that attended House approval of this bill is
important because the measure essentially served as the basis for the
national study commission that the House-Senate Conference Committee
ultimately authorized. The House Committee Report accompanying H.R.
908 has considerable significance for several reasons. Neither the
Judiciary Committee nor the Subcommittee conducted any hearings on
the bill. Moreover, floor debate on H.R. 908 can fairly be characterized
as terse. The floor statements of the measure's foremost proponents,
namely Representative Coble and Representative Henry Hyde (R-Ill.),
chair of the Judiciary Committee, also appeared to be premised
substantially on the House Committee Report. This report correspondingly informs understanding of the statutory language that authorizes the
study, especially the phrasing that is cryptic or unclear. Furthermore, the
report was effectively the last, most comprehensive, specific, and
authoritative pronouncement, while it illuminates the convoluted, lengthy
legislative process that culminated in the commission's approval.
The House Committee Report afforded numerous instructive insights
regarding the commission and its responsibilities. Perhaps most
important, the report amplified and clarified the duties that Congress
anticipated for the entity and the developments that led to its creation.
125. See 143 CONG. REC. H3223, H3225 (daily ed. June 3, 1997).
126. See id. at H3223.
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The House Committee Report stated that the "legislation originated as
a response to recurring attempts to divide the largest of the federal
judicial circuits, the Ninth," but admonished that the commission
proposal "represents a sound approach to a problem of national concern:
explosive growth in the caseload of all of the courts of appeals." 127
The report observed that appellate filings had grown by over 200
percent and that the number of judgeships had increased, albeit much
more slowly, since the mid-1970s, although the appellate system's
structure has remained essentially unchanged from its 1891 establishment.128 The Judiciary Committee declared that the "time is ripe for
a careful, objective study aimed at determining whether that structure
can adequately serve the needs of the 21st century" and that the
commission's task would be to undertake the study. 129
The House Committee Report reiterated that the "immediate occasion
for the Commission proposal was the debate over dividing the Ninth
Circuit, [however,] the proposal has its origins in the work of the
Federal Courts Study Committee, which was created by Act of Congress
in 1988."130 The Study Committee's 1990 report
concluded that the federal appellate courts were already
experiencing a "crisis of volume" [and] ... expressed the
view that "within as few as five years the nation could have
to decide whether or not to abandon the present circuit
structure in favor of an alternative structure that might
better organize the more numerous a~J?ellate judges needed
to grapple with a swollen caseload."
The Committee had explored several " 'structural alternatives' " but
endorsed none, calling for " 'further inquiry and discussion.' " 132
The House Committee Report stated that the new commission would
"take up where the Federal Courts Study Committee left off [and] would
be the first of its kind since the [Hruska Commission] which completed
its work in 1975."133 The report found it obvious that
dramatic changes have taken place in the work of the
federal courts in those two decades, including the explosive
127. See
128. See
129. See
130. See
131. See
132. See
133. See
24, 26-31.

HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 1.
id.
id. at 1-2.
id. at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 26-31.
HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 2.
id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-
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growth noted above. . . . [but that] there have been no
structural alterations except for the division of the old Fifth
Circuit and the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. 134
During the June 3 floor debate, the principal advocates of the study
commission made numerous statements similar to those included in the
report and occasionally quoted verbatim from that document. Illustrative
are the remarks of Representative Coble, chair of the subcommittee with
responsibility for the bill:
H.R. 908 was introduced in response to recurring attempts
to divide the largest of the Federal judicial circuits, the
[N]inth.
However, if properly implemented, the commission
proposal represents a sound approach to a problem of
national concern, and that is the explosive growth in the
caseload of all of the courts of appeals.
The time is right, it seems to me, for a careful, objective
study aimed at determining whether that structure can
adequately serve the needs of the 21st century. The task of
the commission would be to carry out that study. 135
Representative Coble added for emphasis that the entity was "not to be
exclusively restricted to the [N]inth [C]ircuit [but] hopefully, will
examine the entire system and come back with a recommendation that
the commission deems appropriate," even as he observed that the "study
is a responsible method to evaluate any prospective split in the [N]inth
[C]ircuit and is generally overdue." 136

134. See HOUSE REPOKI', supra note 15, at 2; see also supra text accompanying notes 12,
21-23.
135. See 143 CONG. REC. H3223 (daily ed. June 3, 1997). He then offered comments nearly
identical to those in the Report:
The proposed commission would be the first of its kind since the Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, also known as the Hruska
Commission, which completed its work in 1975, or more than two decades ago.
Needless to say, dramatic changes have taken place in the work of the Federal
courts in those two decades, but there have been no structural alterations except for
the division of the old [F]ifth [C]ircuit and the creation of the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.

Id.; see also supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
136. See 143 CONG. REC. H3224 (daily ed. June 3, 1997).
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Representative Hyde, the House Judiciary Committee chair, echoed
numerous propositions which appeared in the House Committee Report
and a number of ideas that Representative Coble propounded. Perhaps
most important, Representative Hyde reiterated that the "goal of the
commission will be to study the entire Federal appellate court system,
but, of course, with a particular view toward addressing the problems
facing the largest and most diverse circuit we have, the [N]inth."137 He
characterized the study envisioned as a "responsible method to evaluate
the structure of the Federal appellate courts and make recommendations
that can provide a sound foundation for congressional action in the
future," even while recognizing that "[p]roblems do exist in the size and
makeup of the [N]inth [C]ircuit," which the commission would equitably
analyze. 138
The Judiciary Committee chair repeated and elaborated the notions
relating to the commission's origins and purposes that were expressed
in the report and in Representative Coble's floor statement. For instance,
Representative Hyde reaffirmed that the entity would "take up where the
Federal Court Study Committee left off' and recounted several of this
committee's most important findings, such as its conclusion that the
appellate courts were experiencing a "crisis of volume." 139
Representative Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal.), a minority member of the
Judiciary Committee, reaffirmed some of the above ideas, especially
regarding the crisis of volume and the commission's purposes, and
expanded on certain propositions. 140 Most significantly, she acknowledged that the study's initial impetus were proposals to "split the
[N]inth [C]ircuit."141 Representative Lofgren emphasized, however, that
the "proposed commission actually has a broader mandate . . . than
studying the [N]inth [C]ircuit. In fact, as we enter the twenty-first
century, we need to take a look at the entire range of possibilities."142
She admitted that the entity could certainly make a suggestion "to split
one of the circuits, to reconfigure the circuits and then Congress could
follow the Commission's recommendation or be free to choose another
alternative." 143

137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id. He found that the study "could not be more timely,'' reciting data reflecting
that "in fiscal 1996, the number of appeals filed in the 12 regional courts of appeals rose 4
percent to 51,991 [which was] an all-time high in filings, with eight circuits reporting increases."
Id.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. She added, ''Whatever we intend to do, I know that we will be better off with the
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In mid-July, Senators from the Pacific Northwest, including Senator
Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), Senator Slade Gorton (R-Wash.) and Senator
Burns, who are members of the Appropriations Committee, persuaded
the committee to approve an appropriations rider that would have
divided the Ninth Circuit. 144 On July 29, the full Senate adopted this
appropriations rider. The proposal would have left California, Nevada,
Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in that court. 14s The measure
would have created a new Twelfth Circuit that encompassed Alaska,
Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington. 146 The
rider authorized fifteen judges for the Ninth Circuit and thirteen judges
for the Twelfth Circuit. 147 The proposal afforded the Twelfth Circuit
two co-equal seats and two co-equal court clerks located in Phoenix and
in Seattle. 148
Republican senators-principally from the West-voiced many
arguments, few of which were new, in favor of the Senate action during
floor debate. For example, they contended that the Ninth Circuit's size
in terms of population, geography, caseload, and judges creates
problems. 149 The court's geographic magnitude was said to impose
travel expenses on attorneys and litigants, while its caseload creates
delay and inconsistency in the court's decisionmaking. 1so Numerous
Senate members also suggested that the rate at which the Supreme Court
reverses the Ninth Circuit shows that the court is out of touch. 151 They
claimed that projected population growth in the region will exacerbate
these difficulties. 152
Some circuit-splitting opponents argued that there is too much
uncertainty about the precise nature of the problems facing the Ninth
Circuit and other appellate courts and the most effective solutions for
those difficulties to implement the dramatic step of dividing the Ninth
Circuit today. 1s3 Many important questions involving this court and the
other regional circuits are ones about which there is insufficient
expert advice that this commission will provide to us. It is always better to have good,
thoughtful, expert advice than to simply move forward, especially in dealing with the judiciary."
Id.
144. See S. 1022, § 305(b)(2), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
145. Id.§ 305; 143 CONG. REC. 8041 et seq. (daily ed. July 24, 1997).
146. s. 1022, § 305(b)(3).
147. Id. § 305(c)(l)-(2).
148. Id. § 305(d)(l)-(2).
149. See 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statements of Sen.
Gorton).
150. See id. at S8046 (statements of Sen. Hatch).
151. See id. at S8044, S8048 (statements of Sen. Gorton and Sen. Burns).
152. See id. at S8045 (statement of Sen. Gorton).
153. See id. at S8046-47 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
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information. For example, the circuit-splitting proponents have argued
that the Ninth Circuit decides cases too slowly because of its size. 154
However, no data correlate size with time to resolution. Indeed,
vacancies in ten of the court's twenty-eight authorized judgeships and
the Senate's confirmation of no judge for the court since January
1996155 better explain the time required to treat appeals.
The proposal to split the Ninth Circuit also posed very real pragmatic
problems. It would have been an administrative nightmare to establish
a new court, especially one with two co-clerks and co-equal headquarters, by October 1. One problem, for example, was that the existing
courthouses in Phoenix and Seattle were not constructed to accommodate circuit headquarters. 156 The statute that divided the old Fifth
Circuit correspondingly took effect one year after passage, and the court
only ceased to exist some three years later. Moreover, the division
suggested improperly allocated the caseload. For instance, judges of the
new Twelfth Circuit would have had to resolve 239 appeals annually,
while judges of the proposed Ninth Circuit would have had to decide
363 cases annually-which would have been fifty percent more. 157
During floor debate, senators defeated 55-45 along political party lines
an amendment that would have authorized a study similar to the one that
the House had approved. 158
The Senate appropriations rider provoked strong opposition from
Representative Hyde, chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Coble, chair of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and
Intellectual Property, and members of the House who represent
California. 159 These members of Congress enunciated numerous
reasons for their opposition. For example, the critics evinced concern
that the bifurcation envisioned would improperly distribute the caseload
between the two proposed courts and that the Senate was using the
appropriations process to make an important substantive determination. 160 They also suggested that dividing the Ninth Circuit would have
been too dramatic an action to institute without clear comprehension of

154. See id. at S8046 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
155. See id. at S8045 (statement of Sen. Leahy).
156. See id. at S8043 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
157. See id. at S8056 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
158. See id. at S8061 (a rollcall vote, no. 204, was taken).
159. See, e.g., Letter from Henry J. Hyde, Chair, House Judiciary Committee, to Robert
Livingston, Chair, House Committee on Appropriations (Sept 5, 1997); Letter from Jerry Lewis
et al., Members of Congress from California, to Harold Rogers, Chair, Appropriations Subcomm.
on Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary (Oct. 17, 1997). I also rely in this paragraph on
conversations with individuals who are knowledgeable about the developments that occurred.
160. See 143 CONG. REC. at S8042 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
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the exact difficulties that the court and the appellate system are
experiencing, what impacts those complications are having, and the most
effective means of addressing the difficulties. 161
In mid-November, the House-Senate Conference Committee on
Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations rejected the appropriations rider
that would have divided the Ninth Circuit. 162 The Conference Committee substituted a national study that incorporated numerous aspects of
the proposals which both Houses had considered and that essentially
embodied much included in H.R. 908. 163 The compromise measure
provides for five commission members, all of whom the Chief Justice
of the United States was to appoint within thirty days, accords the entity
ten months to study and two months to prepare a report and recommendations, and adopts verbatim H.R. 908's charge. On December 19, Chief
Justice Rehnquist appointed retired Supreme Court Justice Byron White,
United States Court of Appeals Judges Gilbert Merritt of the Sixth
Circuit and Pamela Rymer of the Ninth Circuit, United States District
Judge William Browning of Arizona and N. Lee Cooper, the immediately past president of the American Bar Association (ABA). 164
In sum, the November 1997 statutory provision that authorizes a
national commission to examine the federal appeals courts leaves
unclear, overly general or unresolved several important features of that
analysis while affording the entity a relatively short period to complete
its work. The second Part of this Article, therefore, attempts to clarify
those dimensions of the evaluation which remain ambiguous or which
Congress did not specify or resolve and offers suggestions that should
enable the commission to use its brief time most effectively.
II. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTuRE
A. Suggestions for Resolving Unclear
Aspects of the Study
The legislation that approved the national assessment leaves unclear,
overly general, or unresolved certain aspects of that analysis. The most
significant features which require clarification, specification or resolution
implicate the functions that the commission is to perform. The second
part of the entity's charge that appears ambiguous states that it is to
"study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals

161. See id.
162. See H.R. 2267, § 305, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
163. See id.; see also supra text accompanying note 135.
164. See Bill Kisliuk, White, Rymer to Consider Circuit Split, THE RECORDER, Dec. 22,
1997, at 1; Members Named to Commission, THE THIRD BRANCH, Feb. 1998, at 1.
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system, with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit." 165 Perhaps least
clear is exactly how much emphasis the commission should accord the
Ninth Circuit in conducting the evaluation.
The above examination of the authorizing language and the legislative history that accompanied the measure's passage suggests that the
Ninth Circuit will receive special consideration. 166 The statutory phrase
"with particular reference to the Ninth Circuit" and the applicable
legislative history-such as ideas in the House Committee Report,
namely that the study proposal was introduced in "response to recurring
attempts to divide the largest of the Federal judicial circuits, the
[N]inth,"167 and the pronouncements of the assessment's principal
proponents168-show that the commission must specifically scrutinize
this court.
My earlier discussion indicates that Congress also meant for the
remaining regional circuits and the appellate system to receive considerable analysis. 169 The statutory wording of the instruction to "study the
structure and alignment of the Federal Court of Appeals system" 110 and
the declarations of the evaluation's major advocates support this
view. 171 Most importantly, prior iterations used the term "federal courts
of appeal"; therefore, addition of the word "system" signifies legislative
intent that the assessment include all twelve regional circuits. 172
Champions of the endeavor concomitantly proclaimed that the
commission's goal would be to analyze the "entire Federal appellate
court system."173 These proponents and the House Committee Report
apparently anticipated that the commission would examine the system's
dozen units when they expressly stated that it would "take up where the
Federal Courts Study Committee left off' because this entity had
considered every circuit. 174 The advocates and the report correspondingly characterized the commission as a "sound approach to a problem
of national concern: explosive growth in the caseload of all of the courts
of appeals." 175 The commission's champions additionally observed that
the study group "would be the first of its kind since the" Hruska

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See H.R. 908, § l(b)(2), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
See supra text accompanying notes 111-12, 127, 130, 135-38, 141-43.
H.R. 908, § l(b)(2); HOUSE REPoIIT, supra note 15, at 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 111-12, 127, 130, 135-38, 141-43.
See id.
See H.R. 908, § l(b)(2) (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying notes 111-12, 127, 130, 135-38, 141-43.
See supra text accompanying note 112.
See supra text accompanying notes 136-37.
See supra text accompanying notes 133, 139.
See HOUSE REPOIIT, supra note 15, at 1.
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Commission, an entity that explored the whole system even while
concentrating on the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 176
The above information, accordingly, suggests that the commission
ought to evaluate the Ninth Circuit, the remaining regional appeals
courts, and the appellate system. The entity should focus on the Ninth
Circuit but must not assess this court to the exclusion of the other
regional circuits or the system. Congress, thus, seemed to afford the
commission considerable latitude in deciding precisely how much to
emphasize the Ninth Circuit.
The commission could exercise this discretion in several ways to
maximize the advantages it can derive from the effort. For example, the
entity may want to employ the Ninth Circuit as a surrogate for certain
appeals courts that are similarly situated in terms of parameters-such
as the problems that they experience, the courts' judicial complements,
their caseloads' magnitude, the populations which the circuits serve, the
time that the courts require to resolve appeals, and potential solutions to
the difficulties being encountered. Illustrative might be the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, which have memberships, dockets and disposition
times, and use remedial measures that resemble those employed within
the Ninth Circuit. Analysis and comparison of the three courts could
yield instructive insights relating specifically to large circuits' operation.177
The commission might concomitantly attempt to evaluate as a group
other appeals courts that seem analogous or share certain characteristics,
perhaps deploying one as a template. Exemplary are the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits, which encompass comparatively large land masses but
are rather sparsely populated, and the Second, Third and Seventh
Circuits, which include relatively few states, serve substantial numbers
of people, and have somewhat similar caseloads that they treat in
numerous comparable ways.
The initial two components of the commission's charge require it to
"study the present division of the United States into the several judicial
circuits [and] study the structure and alignment of the Federal Court of
Appeals system."178 The entity could narrowly read these instructions
to preclude consideration of the burgeoning caseloads and the resource
limitations that are the principal problems presently confronted by the

176. See supra text accompanying notes 133, 135; see also supra text accompanying notes
18-24, 38-39.
177. Analysis specifically could determine whether the size of the three large courts
undermines collegiality or correlates with speed of resolution.
178. See H.R. 908, § l(b)(l)-(2).
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appellate courts. 179 However, the third part of the commission's
mandate expressly prescribes suggestions which would foster the
appeals' "expeditious and effective disposition." 180 Moreover, much in
the relevant legislative history clearly provides that mounting dockets
are to be the study's central focus. For instance, the House Committee
Report characterizes the commission as a "sound approach to a problem
of national concern: explosive growth in the caseload of all of the courts
of appeals," 181 while several of the assessment's proponents espoused
similar sentiments. 182
The third constituent of the entity's instructions commands it to
report "recommendations for such changes in circuit boundaries or
structure as may be appropriate for the expeditious and effective
disposition of the [appellate caseload] consistent with fundamental
concepts of fairness and due process."183 This language seemingly
envisions that the commission will only forward suggestions for
modifications in appeals courts' boundaries or structure which comport
with essential tenets of equity and due process, while considerable,
relevant legislative history speaks in terms of circuit structure and
structural remedies.
The statutory phraseology employed and some legislative history,
however, could be construed to encompass solutions other than
structural ones. The legislation's words can fairly be interpreted as
empowering the commission to explore and recommend non-structural
approaches, if it finds that "changes in circuit boundaries or structure
[would not be] appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition . . . of appeals, [or would not be] consistent with fundamental
concepts of fairness and due process." 184 For example, the Ninth
Circuit split that the 1997 Senate appropriations rider required would
have assigned judges of the proposed Ninth Circuit fifty percent more
cases annually than judges of the new Twelfth Circuit, so that the
structural modification contemplated for the projected Ninth Circuit
might have failed to facilitate appeals' prompt or efficacious resolution
or to honor basic principles of equity and due process. 185 Should the
commission determine that alterations in appellate court boundaries or
structure would not foster expeditious or effective appellate disposition
179. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 15-18, 127-28, 135, 139.
180. See H.R. 908, § l(b)(3).
181. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 15, at 1; see also supra text accompanying notes 12728.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 135, 139.
See H.R. 908, § l(b)(3).
See id.
See supra p. 216.
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consistent with core precepts of fairness and due process, Congress
apparently intended the entity to scrutinize additional measures and
suggest those that would promote prompt and efficacious resolution
while satisfying fundamental tenets of equity and due process.
Certain aspects of the legislative history, particularly those mentioning various alternatives to structural modifications, support this
construction. For instance, the House Committee Report alludes to the
prospect of authorizing more judgeships, which is an important nonstructural option, and one which the Federal Courts Study Committee
explicitly recommended, as well as to that entity's endorsement of no
structural approach and its call for greater inquiry and discussion. 186
Moreover, during the House floor debate, one commission proponent
observed that "as we enter the 21st century, we need to take a look at
the entire range of possibilities." 187 It is also important to remember
that Congress did not adopt language in identical Senate and House bills
that would have commanded the commission to recommend "appropriate
changes in circuit boundaries or structure."188
Congress clearly envisioned that the commission would emphasize
structural alterations when examining alternatives and making suggestions; however, confining the entity to structural modifications would
have been overly narrow. Congress and the courts have many nonstructural options that they can apply to address the complications
created by docket growth and by other phenomena that appeals courts
are addressing and will continue to meet. Illustrative are legislative
authorization for additional judgeships; efficiency measures, such as
administrative units and a limited en bane procedure, which the Ninth
Circuit has deployed; and numerous other techniques, namely limitations
on oral arguments and written decisions and various alternatives to
dispute resolution (ADR), that all of the regional circuits have invoked.189
Finally, even if the commission concludes that Congress intended it
only to consider and recommend changes in appellate court structure,
the statutory terminology, "circuit boundaries or structure," which
Congress employed could be read rather comprehensively. 190 For

186. See supra text accompanying notes 128, 132. The report and the commission's
advocates also stated that the entity would continue the Federal Courts Study Committee's work,
thus intimating that the commission would study the options that the committee examined.
187. See 143 CONG. REC. H3224 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) (statement of Rep. Lofgren).
188. See S. 283, § 1(b)(3), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997); H.R. 639, § l(b)(3), 105th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1997).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 17, 41-46; see also infra notes 231-33, 266-68 and
accompanying text.
190. See S. 283, § l(b)(3); H.R. 639, § 1(b)(3).
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instance, the Federal Courts Study Committee included in its examination of alterations that the committee characterized as structural the
creation of a new appellate tier and national subject matter courts,
possibilities which seem broader than merely reconfiguring the existing
regional circuits. 191
B. Suggestions for Efficacious Use of
Commission Time
Congress allotted the commission less than twelve months to
complete a very significant, exceedingly difficult, and potentially
enormous undertaking. The entity, therefore, must ensure that it makes
the best use of the relatively limited time that Congress afforded. The
commission could implement a number of approaches that could enable
it to proceed most efficaciously.
1. Information Collection

One important issue that the entity must initially face is whether it
should attempt to collect, analyze, and synthesize systematically original
empirical data. Of course, the commission would prefer to have the
maximum amount of this information feasible; however, the temporal
restraints under which it is laboring may well preclude the compilation
and assessment of any such material. For example, the resolution of
complex appeals in many appellate courts and of numerous cases in the
Ninth Circuit currently requires greater time than the entity has to
conclude its work.
Perhaps the most that the commission might hope to achieve is
selective or representative sampling of empirical data. Several reasons
suggest that the Ninth Circuit would be an obvious candidate for this
treatment. First, Congress specifically instructed the commission to
emphasize the court. 192 Second, the Ninth Circuit typifies in significant
ways the other large appellate courts. 193 Third, practically all of the
appeals courts are experiencing and addressing many problems that the
Ninth Circuit has encountered and treated. 194 Fourth, the Ninth Circuit
itself and evaluators who are not affiliated with the court have assembled and analyzed considerable empirical information relating to the
circuit. Insofar as the commission can collect empirical material on
appellate courts apart from the Ninth Circuit, the entity may want to

191.
192.
193.
194.

See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrITEE, supra note 26, at 119-21.
See supra text accompanying note 163.
See supra text accompanying note 177.
See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
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focus on those that could function as exemplars for certain of the
remaining courts. For instance, the apparent similarities between the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits as well as among the Second, Third, and
Seventh Circuits might mean that these courts deserve emphasis. 195
The commission should assemble empirical data on docket size,
composition, and complexity in the regional circuits; the resources-especially judges-that courts have to treat appeals; and the time
required, and the measures that they use, to resolve cases. The entity
could glean material through interviewing or circulating questionnaires
to judges, attorneys, and parties who participate in appeals. The
commission might correspondingly consult or rely on the survey
instruments employed by the FJC in its 1993 assessment and in other
endeavors, such as the Center's Rule 11 work, and those instruments on
which additional entities, including the Federal Courts Study Committee
and the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, have relied.
The commission also could "take up where the Federal Courts Study
Committee left off' by scrutinizing the committee's findings as to
problems and solutions, such as the five structural alternatives that the
entity explored. The commission might concomitantly review the
determinations and recommendations regarding the appeals courts in the
1995 Judicial Conference evaluation and the 1993 FJC analysis.
Regardless of whether the commission decides to gather original
empirical information, it must assemble and consider the largest quantity
of empirical data and other relevant material that evaluators have
previously collected on the regional circuits. For example, there have
been ten major analyses of the appellate courts since the time of the
Hruska Commission endeavor. 196 The FJC, the Judicial Conference and
the Federal Courts Study Committee have recently completed assessments according varied emphasis to the appeals courts. 197
The efforts of Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), chair of the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, to
evaluate appellate caseloads, judicial resources and practices also could
be a helpful source of information. 198 Moreover, the regional circuits

195. See supra p. 216.
196. See supra text accompanying note 25.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 34. The FJC study is the only one whose
principal focus is the appeals courts. See also REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMfITEE, supra note 26.
198. See, e.g., Bruce Brown, Grassley Has Judges Grousing, THE AM. LAW., Mar. 1996,
at 16 (describing a survey Senator Grassley sent to all federal judges); Hearings on Judgeship
Allocations Continue, THE THIRD BRANCH, Oct 1997, at 4; see also Carl Tobias, Choosing
Federal Judges in the Second Clinton Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 753
(1997).
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themselves as well as the FJC and the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts have voluminous material on docket size,
constitution, and complexity, resources to decide cases, the time needed
to conclude appeals, and the measures that courts employ to expedite
resolution.
The commission should seek the assistance of numerous public and
private entities that possess considerable empirical information and
additional relevant material as well as expertise relating to the appellate
courts. Illustrative are the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, the
American Law Institute, the ABA, and the National C<?nter for State
Courts. The commission must encourage the maximum possible
involvement in its activities by interested institutions and individuals.
2. Identifying the Problems
a. The Regional Circuits
The commission must systematically identify the complications that
pose now, and will continue to present, the greatest difficulty for the
regional circuits and determine whether they are or will be sufficiently
problematic to deserve remediation with measures in addition to those
that the appeals courts now apply. The examination above-including
considerable recent work, such as the assessments undertaken by the
Federal Courts Study Committee, the FJC and the Judicial Conference-suggests that the increasing number and complexity of appellate
filings as well as inadequate resources to decide the cases have been,
and will continue being, the principal complications, but it remains
unclear whether they are troubling enough to warrant the invocation of
new approaches.
There may presently or subsequently be other problems. For
example, some federal courts observers contend that certain phenomena-namely the myriad combinations of judges who can resolve an issue
in the larger circuits-that implicate multiplying dockets have fostered
inconsistent decisionmaking among and within the appeals courts. 199
However, no empirical data show that intercircuit conflicts have caused
difficulty in the sense that the appellate system needs more authoritative
precedents, and the FJC found "little evidence that intracircuit inconsis-

199. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8048 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Conrad Bums); 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Slade
Gorton); Martha J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal
Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1, 32-39 (Federal law is becoming "incoherent" due to "caseload
pressures and productivity-oriented reforms.").
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tency is a significant problem."200 Rising caseloads and related factors,
such as resource restraints, have correspondingly led to bureaucratization
that impose disadvantages, namely the overdelegation of judges'
responsibilities and decreased judicial accountability and visibility.
However, no empirical information demonstrates that bureaucratization
has created serious complications.201
The commission, therefore, should emphasize the crisis of volume by
attempting to identify with precision its character and effects and
whether the situation is problematic enough to justify the implementation of additional alternatives. For instance, the entity might evaluate
dockets' present and projected size, makeup, and complexity, the time
that regional circuits require to decide appeals, and the resources of each
appellate court. Illustrative are recent empirical data showing that pro se
cases, many of which involve prisoner litigation, comprise forty percent
of the 52,000 appeals that parties pursued during the 1996 fiscal
year.202 Material compiled by researchers in 1995 also estimates that
the regional circuits will receive 334,800 cases and will need 1660
judges under the existing formula to address their dockets in the year
2020.203
After the commission systematically has collected, analyzed and
synthesized all of the relevant information, it must attempt to ascertain
as conclusively as possible whether the complications that the appellate
courts do and will confront are so troubling as to require treatment with
approaches that are distinct from those which they now apply.204 One
means of making the determinations is by deciding whether the regional
circuits currently resolve appeals fairly, promptly, inexpensively, and

200. See Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved
lntercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Prrr. L. REV. 693 (1995) (affording intercircuit idea); MCKENNA,
supra note 32, at 94 (affording intracircuit idea); see also Carl Tobias, Some Cautions About
Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 389, 398-99 (1997).
201. See MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 49-53; see generally Patricia M. Wald, The Problem
with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?, 42 Mo. L. REV.
766 (1983).
202. See 143 CONG. REC. H3223, H3224 (daily ed. June 3, 1997) (statement of Rep. Henry
Hyde) (affording 52,000 figure); Caseload Increases Throughout Judiciary, THE THIRD BRANCH,
Mar. 1996, at 1, 2 (affording 40% and prisoner litigation figures from 1995).
203. See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at 15-16; see also MCKENNA, supra note 32,
at 23-53 (indicating courts address dockets of diverse size and complexity with disparate
resources and consume different time reaching decisions and discrepancies in dependence on
measures, namely ADR and staff, and in oral arguments and dispositions accorded appeals).
204. The entity also may attempt to identify instructive correlations, such as that between
circuit size and time for resolution or case precedent's consistency. See MCKENNA, supra note
32, at 94. The entity as well might calibrate the above disparities' effects in terms of parameters,
including litigant satisfaction and resource savings.
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consistently. Should the commission find that the courts do not so
process cases, the deployment of additional options might be indicated.
Another way of reaching these judgments is to identify the impacts that
the applicable difficulties and remedial measures have on the appellate
ideal: the traditional idea that judges hear oral arguments, closely confer,
and write thoroughly-reasoned opinions that explain the results and that
are publicly available in all appeals. 205 The commission may ascertain
that courts essentially honor this ideal because, for example, judges
afford oral arguments and written decisions to those cases that need
them. If the entity does so find, it should conclude that the complications are insufficiently problematic to justify the adoption of new
mechanisms. Considerable information presently suggests, and the
commission might well determine, that the regional circuits do not and
will not face difficulties that are troubling enough to warrant employment of techniques other than the ones that the appeals courts now use.
b. Ninth Circuit
The commission must specifically focus on the precise complications
that the Ninth Circuit is experiencing and will encounter and whether
they cause sufficient concern to require the implementation of alternatives, particularly structural options, that would augment the many
measures the court has already applied. Most important will be the
current and future size, composition, and complexity of dockets; the
resources, especially judges, for deciding appeals; and the time required
for terminating cases. For example, the Ninth Circuit now has twentyeight active judges to address the largest appellate docket of 8500 yearly
filings, and these statistics prompted the Judicial Conference to request
that Congress authorize ten additional judgeships for the court. Quite
significant will be the efficacy of mechanisms, particularly the limited
en bane procedure, which the Ninth Circuit presently applies.
The commission should scrutinize the pace of Ninth Circuit
dispositions. Recent information suggests that the court resolves appeals
more promptly in terms of certain parameters than most circuits and less
expeditiously than some in other ways. 206 The commission must refine
this material and use it and any additional information that the entity
can collect to ascertain whether the court needs greater time for treating
cases than the remaining circuits, and, if so, the commission should
attempt to identify exactly when and why temporal disparities arise in
205. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 21-27; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 109.
206. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 7; see also MCKENNA, supra
note 32, at 32-35 (analyzing circuit disposition times).
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the appellate process. For instance, thne to resolution may be a function
of the docket's magnitude, constitution, or complexity; the available
judicial resources, including the ten vacant judgeships; the comparatively
high percentage of cases in which the court grants oral arguments and
issues written opinions; or the circuit's substantial contingent of judges,
a factor which purportedly erodes collegiality and, thus, may delay
dispositions.207
Some observers of the Ninth Circuit also claim that the size of the
court, particularly the circuit's enormous docket, contributes to conflicts
in the court's case law. However, no empirical information presently
demonstrates that intracircuit inconsistency poses significant difficulty,
while the only systematic study of the operation of precedent in a large
appeals court found that the Ninth Circuit has generally succeeded in
avoiding conflicts between panel decisions.208
Individuals who favor bifurcating the court have concomitantly
expressed dissatisfaction with its decisionmaking in substantive
areas-such as natural resources, criminal law and the death penalty-proffering as evidence the substantial percentage of Ninth Circuit
determinations that the Supreme Court reverses.209 Critics of circuitsplitting have responded that this concern primarily implicates certain
statutory requirements with which these circuit-division proponents
disagree and, therefore, the advocates should persuade Congress to
change the applicable legislation.210 Moreover, the reversal rate is not
very probative,211 partly because it can be attributed to many variables,
most of which only tangentially involve Ninth Circuit decisionmaking.
These include the factors that animate lawyers and litigants to appeal,
the peculiar, and perhaps idiosyncratic, phenomena which prompt the
Justices to review specific cases and the law, facts, and policy that lead
the Supreme Court to resolve particular appeals as it does. The
commission, accordingly, might examine the consistency of Ninth
207. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 5; infra text accompanying
note 213. It presently appears that the region's population will dramatically increase in the near
future and exacerbate certain of these phenomena, such as growing appeals.
208. See MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 94; see generally Arthur D. Hellman, Maintaining
Consistency in the Law of the l.Arge Circuit, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE 55-90 (Arthur D.
Hellman ed., 1990); Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-I.Aw Process in the
l.Arge Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915 (1991); Hellman, supra note 67. The commission
should specifically ascertain whether the limited, en bane mechanism facilitates consistency.
209. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. S8041, S8044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Gorton); id. at S8047 (statement of Sen. Bums); see also supra text accompanying note 71.
210. See supra text accompanying note 72.
211. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Getting the High Court's Attention, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1997,
at 46 (quoting Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Procter Hug, Jr. and Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen S.
Trott); see also Baker, supra note 6, at 943-44; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1373-74.
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Circuit precedent and the court's substantive determinations more
generally, although these inquiries may well prove unproductive.
Because the Ninth Circuit addresses the largest docket it probably
places greater reliance on staff than other courts. For example, Ninth
Circuit staff attorneys screen many cases, especially pro se and prisoner
litigation, to help suggest the oral and Written dispositions that those
appeals will receive and to minimize the possibility of intracircuit
inconsistency.212 The commission, therefore, should attempt to determine whether this enhanced bureaucratization has detrimentally affected
case resolution by, for instance, overdelegating judicial tasks or
disproportionately increasing the time that judges must devote to staff
management.213
The commission must remember that important criticisms leveled at
the court by circuit-splitting champions can be ascribed to phenomena
for which the court has little responsibility. Illustrative are claims that
circuit precedent is inconsistent, that the court consumes too much time
in resolving appeals, and that its magnitude undermines collegiality-an
attribute which allegedly limits potential conflicts in case law and
expedites resolution. Insofar as circuit precedent lacks consistency,
appellate dispositions are delayed, or there is insufficient collegiality, the
phenomena appear to result principally from current vacancies in ten
active judgeships and partly from the court's concomitant need to rely
on judges who are not its active members.214
Finally, the commission must attempt to ascertain as definitively as
possible whether the Ninth Circuit does or will address difficulties that
are troubling enough to justify the application of approaches apart from
the plethora of mechanisms that the court has used or could employ. For
example, some material indicates, and the entity may find, that the
measures instituted-including the resources committed-by the Ninth
Circuit have enabled the court to resolve its gigantic docket equitably,
promptly, economically, and consistently while minimally affecting the
appellate ideal. Accordingly, retention of the status quo or continued
experimentation with previously tested or new non-structural approaches
will apparently be indicated.

212. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45, 68.
213. See supra text accompanying note 200.
214. For many years, the court's enormous docket has compelled this reliance, but the
vacancies' large number and longstanding nature have rendered the need acute. See Carl Tobias,
Federal Judicial Selection in a Time of Divided Government, 47 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming
1998).
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3. Identifying the Solutions
If the commission conclusively determines that the regional circuits,
the appellate system, or the Ninth Circuit does or will encounter
complications that are sufficiently problematic to require remediation
with alternatives which the courts have not applied, it must undertake
the broadest feasible examination of potential solutions, including their
advantages and disadvantages. The entity also should attempt to identify
exactly what combination of measures alone and collectively will best
address the difficulties.
It is impossible to denominate precisely those options that might
prove effective and, therefore, deserve close evaluation until the
commission has identified the most pressing complications and
definitively concluded that they are troubling enough to warrant
treatment. Moreover, quite a few study groups, including the Judicial
Conference, the ABA, and the FJC, and many federal courts observers
have assessed most of the prospects.215 I, therefore, principally provide
descriptive analyses, rather than thorough catalogs of the benefits and
detriments, of numerous possibilities that appear to be promising.
Assuming that the commission clearly will find that some regional
circuits do or will confront problems posing sufficient difficulty to
justify the invocation of mechanisms in addition to ones that these
courts presently use, the entity should carefully canvass a wide range of
approaches, including internal and external reforms, that federal and
state courts have applied or might implement. The commission must
survey a plethora of measures because evaluators have conducted more
research on, and therefore better understand, the relevant complications
than the applicable remedies. 216
When examining these options, particularly those which would
restructure the regional circuits, the commission should recognize and
allow for the different and sometimes conflicting reasons that observers
propound for the courts. One traditional view, which is premised on an
evaluation of congressional intent at the time of the original establishment of the modern appellate system in 1891, holds that the appeals
courts consist of relatively few contiguous states sharing common

215. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 25, at 106-286; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 105-21,
123-39, 141-54; see also supra text accompanying notes 18-35.
216. Telephone Conversation with Professor Thomas E. Baker, Professor, Texas Tech
University School of Law (Mar. 15, 1996); see also Tobias, supra note 17, at 1282. I emphasize
the federal courts here, although Professor Baker suggests that state court reforms may be a
fruitful source of ideas. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 298. When the commission surveys
internal and external reforms' efficacy, the entity also may want to develop suggestions for
improvement, if indicated.
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interests,217 although phenomena like globalization and computerization
may have made this idea somewhat obsolete today. Another related
notion is that regional circuits must be close geographically, and in
terms of perspectives, to the district courts whose decisions the appeals
courts review and to the people whom they serve.218
Additional conceptualizations differ significantly from these views.
One idea is that the regional circuits should be diverse, for instance, in
terms of judges' political perspectives, race, gender, or backgrounds as
well as the economic, social and other interests of those jurisdictions
which constitute the courts.219 A second important purpose of the
regional circuits is their federalizing function: the responsibility to
harmonize the Constitution and national policies with state and local
concerns.220 These views resist felicitous reconciliation, although the
commission should remember, and provide for, their inherent tensions.
The entity must extensively explore the advantages and disadvantages
of applying the various alternatives, such as the options' effects on the
Supreme Court, the district courts, the appellate ideal, and economic
costs. For example, every regional circuit has addressed docket
expansion by imposing limitations on the oral arguments granted and
written decisions afforded and by relying more substantially on nonjudicial staff. The commission should attempt to delineate the exact
present and future impacts of these restrictions and of enhanced use of
staff on the appellate ideal.221 Moreover, Congress's traditional solution to appeals court caseload growth of enlarging the bench and
reconfiguring regional circuits may now be outmoded or only a
palliative because the response apparently has negligible effect on
appellate dockets.222 Authorizing additional judgeships could correspondingly increase resources and expedite dispositions. Nonetheless,
this measure might erode collegiality and promote intracircuit inconsis217. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1371-73 (quoting Sen. Mark Hatfield).
218. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. at S8047 (statement of Sen. Bums); but see id. at S8058-59
(statement of Sen. Joseph Biden) ("[g]eography is relevant only in terms of convenience-not
ideology").
219. See supra text accompanying notes 21 & 65; infra text accompanying notes 293, 317.
220. See John M. Wisdom, Requiemfora Great Court, 26 LoY. L. REV. 787, 788 (1980);
see also Baker, supra note 6, at 942; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1372-73; supra note 218
(statement of Sen. Biden). See generally CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COUJn'S § 3,
at 10-13 (5th ed. 1994).
221. See supra text accompanying note 204. The entity also might consider the benefits for
justice and the costs, especially economic, of reattaining the ideal. See generally William M.
Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for The
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996); Tobias, supra note 17, at 1281.
222. See Baker, supra note 6, at 945-49; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1386-90; see also infra
text accompanying notes 223-25, 273-77, 309.
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tency. Indeed, it may be an empty gesture if the President and the
Senate cannot overcome their chronic inability to fill large numbers of
vacancies in those judicial seats that Congress has already approved.223
The commission must then designate the finest remedies for each
appeals court and the appellate system by comparing the options,
relative efficacy in terms of these benefits and detriments. It is
impossible to provide very specific guidance until the entity has
carefully evaluated the relevant problems and solutions. However, the
commission should employ a finely-calibrated analysis that, for instance,
tailors the available approaches to the difficulties that particular regional
circuits and the system confront and emphasizes alternatives that will
offer the maximum advantages and impose the least disadvantages.
The individuals who serve on the commission and its staff should
remember that there are numerous non-structural possibilities that have
fostered prompt, fair, inexpensive, and consistent resolution of appeals
and have essentially honored the appellate ideal. Moreover, these
measures could prove preferable to realignment partly because they
would be less extreme and disruptive. For example, the Judicial
Conference seemingly considered the "disruption of precedent and
judicial administration that [structural] changes generally entail', so
troubling as to recommend emphatically that circuit reconfiguration
"occur only if compelling empirical evidence demonstrates adjudicative
or administrative disfunction in a court so that it cannot continue to
deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent circuit law in the face of
increasing workload.,,224 In 1993, the FJC clearly found that the appellate "system and its judges are under stress,, but admonished that the
pressure did "not appear to be a stress that would be significantly
relieved by structural change.,,ns Additional observers correspondingly
contend that realignment is inefficacious and outmoded primarily
because reconfiguration effectively reallocates, rather than directly
addresses, workload.226 These ideas indicate that the commission must
closely evaluate realignment, proceed cautiously in proposing it, and
perhaps only suggest reconfiguration as a last resort. Indeed, some
material shows, and the entity may well conclude, that the best approach

223. See generally Gordon Berrnant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the
Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 (1994); supra text accompanying note
213; infra text accompanying notes 273-76.
224. See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at 44. Circuit restructuring "should continue
to be, as it has been historically, an infrequent event." Id. at 45 (citation omitted).
225. MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 155.
226. See infra text accompanying notes 277, 309; see also infra text accompanying notes
304-06, 310-11 (affording more reasons why restructuring is inadvisable).
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today would be a refined mix of potential solutions, none of which
seems to be structural.
Finally, the commission's members and staff should keep in mind
some salient phenomena when reviewing possible remedies for both the
regional appeals courts and the Ninth Circuit. They must remember that
the continuation of both caseload growth and almost exclusive reliance
on periodic authorization of additional judgeships and occasional
realignment of appellate courts by Congress and the judiciary means that
the other eleven courts will increasingly grow to resemble the Ninth
Circuit. These phenomena's continuation, therefore, would provide an
important reason why the Ninth Circuit should remain intact.227
a. The Regional Circuits
The commission must analyze the broadest possible spectrum of
measures. I essentially rely upon the organizational format that Professor
Thomas E. Baker followed in his recent thorough examination of the
appellate courts and of the internal and external alternatives that the
regional circuits have employed or might use.228 Thus, I initially
examine internal reforms that appeals courts have implemented or could
effectuate and then explore past and proposed external options.
i. Past and Present Internal Reforms

The regional circuits have applied a plethora of approaches to treat
the difficulties that they confront. Every appellate court has imposed
restrictions on the number of, and the time allotted for, oral arguments229 and has accorded appeals a wide spectrum of types of dispositions, including thoroughly-reasoned written opinions, unpublished
decisions and various forms of summary determinations.230 These

227. I appreciate the tension between my exploration of many alternatives which Congress
and the judiciary might implement and my assumption that their essential inaction will continue.
However, this approach allows for the contingency that my assumption will be incorrect.
228. See BAKER, supra note 25, at xviii-xix, 106-286. Professor Balcer employs the terms
intramural and extramural; however, I employ the more traditional terminology of internal or
procedural solutions and external or structural solutions.
229. See, e.g., !ST CIR. R. 34.l; 5TH CIR. R. 34; see also FED. R. APP. P. 34; BAKER, supra
note 25, at 108 (discussing experimentation with nonargument summary calendar); JOE S. CECIL
& DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT: AN
EXAMINATION OF FOUR COURI'S OF APPEALS (1987). See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at
108-17.
230. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(a)-(c); llTH CIR. R. 36-1 to 36-3; see also BAKER, supra
note 25, at 117-19 (discussing limitations on briefs). See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at
119-35.
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limitations have apparently facilitated case resolution, but they may have
undermined the appellate ideal.231
Numerous regional circuits deploy civil appeal management plans
(CAMP).232 The plans have similar objectives, although their emphases
and specifics differ. 233 Each CAMP attempts to encourage case terminations without court action, accelerate the consideration and disposition
of appeals that receive oral argument, narrow and clarify the issues at
stake, improve briefing and argument, and resolve motions and
procedural questions informally and promptly.234 The measures employed encompass prehearing conferences, appeal tracking forms that
permit processing to commence before records and briefs are filed, staff
monitoring and modification of briefing schedules, and early case
assignments to panels.235
Every court that uses a CAMP and even the circuits that do not rely
substantially on staff to discharge certain responsibilities, such as the
screening of appeals and the drafting of opinions.236 The CAMP
programs and enhanced dependence on staff generally have expedited
case disposition and probably saved judicial resources. However, they
have apparently eroded somewhat the appellate ideal and raised generic
concerns-including overdelegation of judicial duties-about reliance on
staff.237 Some appeals courts employ numerous additional mechanisms.
For example, a few circuits have instituted special procedures to
facilitate the treatment of cases that involve capital punishment,238
while each appellate court has depended on senior and visiting judges
to help resolve expanding dockets.239

231. See, e.g., Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too
Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52; Richman & Reynolds, supra note 221, at 274-76.
232. See, e.g., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Civil Appeals Management
Plan; JAMES B. EAGLIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE
PROGRAM IN 111E SIXTii CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: AN EVALUATION (1990). I rely
substantially here on BAKER, supra note 25, at 135-39.
233. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 136.
234. See id.
235. See, e.g., 8111 CIR. R. 33A; lOTH CIR. R. 33.1.
236. See, e.g., 6111 CIR. R. 18 (concerning pre-argument conferences); 9TH CIR. R. 33-1
(stating conferences are to facilitate settlements); see also BAKER, supra note 25, at 139-47.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 200, 212.
238. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1406; see also 3RD CIR. R. 111 (regarding death penalty
appeals); 9TH CIR. R. 22-1 to 22-6 (same).
239. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 198-201; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 38-39; Richman
& Reynolds, supra note 221, at 287. For more discussion of these reforms, see BAKER, supra
note 25, at 106-50; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 38-53.
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ii. Proposed Internal Reforms
Several study entities, such as the Judicial Conference, the Federal
Courts Study Committee and the FJC, and many additional federal
courts observers have analyzed a substantial number of internal reforms
that the regional circuits might implement. Appeals courts have not
effectuated some of these alternatives; however, others have received
practical application, much of which may fairly be characterized as
experimental in nature.
All of the regional circuits have relied on some form of technology,
principally to realize efficiencies when treating docket growth.240 For
instance, the Third Circuit was apparently the first court to institute an
electronic mail system, while the Eleventh Circuit has employed an
automated case management scheme and facsimile network for
monitoring capital appeals. 241 These and other courts apparently have
saved resources. Nevertheless, Professor Baker has called for additional
research and development in the field of computer-based case and court
management information systems.242 He also has admonished that it
"would be a misplaced hope to expect future technology to do more
than provide added increments of efficiency" because judging is
intrinsically a labor-intensive human endeavor.243
Most, but particularly the larger, regional circuits have depended
substantially on differentiated case management.244 I examined
prototypical case management plans above;245 however, some observers
have recommended this methodology's extension and a few courts have
experimented with newer techniques. For example, the Fifth Circuit has
tested a screening mechanism, which relies substantially on ad hoc, inperson, three-judge screening panels, and this project may evolve into
a second generation procedure for appeals management.246 Some

240. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 152-58; see also Charles W. Nihan & Russell R.
Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration ofJustice in the Federal Courts, 1981
B.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 666-67. See generally ELDRIDGE ADAMS, COURTS AND COMPUTERS (1992).
241. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 152-53; see also J. Michael Greenwood, Follow-Up
Study of Word Processing and Electronic Mail in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (1980),
reprinted in MANAGING APPEALS IN FEDERAL COURTS 801 (FJC 1988).
242. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 152. See generally Nihan & Wheeler, supra note 240.
243. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 154. See generally Douglas E. Winter, Down-Time: A
Fable, LmG., Fall 1986, at 48 (envisioning a future where all disputes are resolved by
computers).
244. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 158-64; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-33. See
generally William L. Whittaker, Differentiated Case Management in United States Courts of
Appeals, 63 F.R.D. 457, 458 (1974).
245. See supra text accompanying notes 229-35.
246. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 160; see also MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-29
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circuits also employ inventorying, which is essentially a more sophisticated means to differentiate cases.247 Another approach with which a
few courts have successfully experimented is the screening of appeals
for jurisdictional defects, so cases that are deficient might be dismissed
as early in the appellate process as possible. 248 Perhaps the greatest
concern about differentiated case management is that those appeals
requiring conventional review will receive this treatment. 249
The appellate courts might implement reforms other than ones that
implicate non-decisional, administrative matters. Some judges and
writers have recommended ways to enhance the art of judging through
the maintenance and improvement of judicial productivity.250 A helpful
illustration is the imposition of deadlines. Several regional circuits have
profitably tested temporal requirements251 and Professor Baker found
that they "are an effective tool whose usefulness has not been fully
developed in the Courts of Appeals."252 Nonetheless, he doubted that
exhorting judges to "do more and do better" work would yield significant benefits, given the substantial number of measures which regional
circuits have applied over the last three decades.253
Another possibility would be appellate court use of expert advisors.254 District judges have occasionally depended on individuals with
specialized expertise, and the Ninth Circuit recently appointed an
appellate commissioner.255 Congress could authorize these officials to
resolve non-merits motions that implicate the time, place, and manner
(analyzing differentiated appeals management or two-track appellate review).
247. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 161-63; see also Hellman, supra note 17, at 957-64
(describing the inventory process used in the Ninth Circuit).
248. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 160-61; see also Bernard S. Meyer, Justice,
Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42 MD. L. REY. 659, 693 (1983).
249. See MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 129; Oakley, supra note 44, at 922.
250. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and
Workload of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REY. 1, 15-16 (1983) (noting Judge Henry J.
Friendly's "argument for the elimination of most of the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction");
Stuart S. Nagel & Miriam K Mills, Using Management Science to Assign Judges to Casetypes,
40 U. MIAMI L. REY. 1317 (1986).
251. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 167-68; Wald, supra note 201, at 785.
252. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 168; see also Patricia McGowan Wald, The Problem
with the Courts: Black-Robes Bureaucracy or Collegiality Under Challenge?, TRIAL, June 1984,
at 28, 33.
253. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 168. See generally Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under
Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50 Omo ST. L.J. 399 (1989).
254. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 173-76.
255. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REY. 509, 552-53 (1974) (describing a proposal that appellate judges have access to
"a scientific assistant"); see also Telephone Conversation with Mark Mendenhall, Assistant
Circuit Executive, U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 20, 1997).
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of appeals and to oversee screening programs.256 A few commentators
and study entities have asserted that reliance on the officers appears
sufficiently promising to warrant controlled experimentation.257
Some observers have correspondingly explored various efforts that
may limit the pursuit of frivolous appellate filings through the increased
imposition of sanctions under statute, rule, or inherent power.258 An
expert ABA Committee concluded that more frequent invocation of
sanctions would not appreciably decrease circuit workloads because only
very weak appeals would be deterred,259 while several writers have
evinced concern that greater sanctioning activity could threaten the
appellate tradition.2ro
The commission must scrutinize additional proposals, which neither
Congress nor the federal regional circuits have officially adopted or
applied. One option is authorizing fewer than three judges to resolve
certain cases, such as those that involve single issues and that are
reviewed under deferential standards.261 This approach would save
judicial resources, but it might diminish the quality of decisionmaking
in specific appeals or more broadly.262 A second possibility would
increase oral argument and deemphasize written presentations.263
Limited experimentation indicates that this model could be workable and
efficient within an inventory scheme for ordinary cases.264 Professor
Baker concluded that "pursuing greater orality, selectively and in
carefully chosen appeals, might prove a useful differentiation of the
appellate practice." 265
256. See Oakley, supra note 44, at 920.
257. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 176; REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 115-16.
258. See 28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1994); FED. R. APP. P. 38; Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 763-64 (1980).
259. See ABA Report, supra note 25, at 547-48.
260. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 180; see also Fred Woods, Sanctions-Stepchild or
Natural Heir to Trial and Appellate Court Delay Reduction?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 665, 681 (1990)

(concluding that sanctions "consistently and properly imposed, in keeping with constitutional due
process," will result in "a marked improvement in our backlogged calendars").
261. See ABA Report, supra note 25, at 115-16; LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at
131-32; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-33; infra note 295.
262. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 173; Tobias, supra note 7, at 1400.
263. See Daniel J. Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 Mo.
L. REV. 732, 747-51 (1983).
264. See id. at 738-47; see also BAKER, supra note 25, at 165-66. But see ROBERI' J.
MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1990).
265. BAKER, supra note 25, at 166. Administrative units and the limited en bane are
reforms aimed primarily at larger courts, and only the Ninth Circuit has used them extensively.
See id. at 155-58; see also supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. For more discussion of
these reforms, see BAKER, supra note 25, at 151-85; MCKENNA, supra note 32, at 127-39.
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iii. Past and Present External Reforms
Congress and the regional circuits have implemented numerous
external reforms, most of which deserve little treatment because they
have previously been rather ineffective and will probably prove no more
efficacious if applied in the future. For example, there have been, and
might be, efforts to restrict the district courts' original jurisdiction,
although Congress appears unlikely to cease adopting new criminal
statutes or creating additional civil causes of action, much less circumscribe existing civil or criminal jurisdiction, in the foreseeable future. 266 Congress and the courts could correspondingly implement
various alternatives to dispute resolution that, similar to limitations on
original jurisdiction, directly aim at the trial court level and only
derivatively implicate the appellate tier. 267 Numerous federal districts
have applied a broad spectrum of these options, and the Civil Justice
Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990 has recently propelled this development.268 Reliance on ADR in the trial courts will probably continue to
increase, and that growth may reduce the demand for judicial resources,
although the relatively nascent character of much experimentation
precludes definitive conclusions.269
Another approach is improvement of the quality of federal legislation, the clarification of which would ostensibly reduce the judicial
resources that courts must devote to statutory interpretation and limit
inconsistent decisionmaking. 270 The District of Columbia Circuit has
instituted a pilot project meant to foster constructive communication
regarding legislation between Congress and the judiciary.271 Some

266. See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 17, at 1269 & n.22 and sources cited therein.
267. See A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal
District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 29-33 (1985); Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging:
Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 24-29; see also Kim Dayton, The
Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 16 IOWA L. REV. 889, 891 (1991).
268. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1994); see also Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform and the
Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1393, 1393, 1420-21 (1992). See
generally DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPoRT TO THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMIITEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, A STUDY OF
THE FlvE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS EsTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
OF 1990 (1997).
269. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 197; Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First
Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 44 (1990). See generally ELIZABETH PLAPINGER ET AL.,
ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURI'S: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES &
LAWYERS (1996).
270. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 224-27.
271. See Cris Carmody, Branches Try to Communicate, NAT'L L.J., July 19, 1993, at 3; see
also 138 CONG. REC. Sl7537 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); BAKER,
supra note 25, at 225-26.
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observers have concomitantly called for the implementation of jurisdictional impact statements or congressional checklists, addressing matters
such as private causes of action, preemption, and statutes of limitation,
that lawmakers would employ when drafting enactments.272 Numerous
obstacles could frustrate successful application of these ideas. Illustrative
are the generic, inherent complications in employing unambiguous
phraseology; the considerable difficulty, including certain pragmatic,
political restraints, in writing clearer statutes; the multiple plausible
constructions that judges, lawyers and litigants can articulate; and the
incentives that animate attorneys and parties to seek appellate review of
legislative terminology.273
Creating additional appellate judgeships is another possibility that I
have mentioned at various junctures in this paper. Congress has
traditionally employed this solution; however, the remedy has imposed
disadvantages. For example, adding judges may exacerbate the problems
of larger courts by increasing the likelihood of intracircuit inconsistency,
by making en bane rehearings unwieldy, and by eroding collegiality.274
Professor Baker concomitantly contends that authorizing more judicial
positions "does not achieve any lasting improvement" and has merely
had a "kind of temporary braking effect."275 An increasingly costconscious Congress may be reluctant to approve additional judgeships,276 and many current members of the federal bench oppose its
expansion.277 On balance, this approach apparently has limited present
and future efficacy.

272. See Chief Justice Burger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-1972, 58 A.B.A. J.
1049, 1050 (1972) (suggesting that "every piece of legislation creating new cases be
accompanied by a 'court impact statement' "); see also REPORI' OF TIIE FEDERAL COURI'S
STUDY COMMrITEE, supra note 26, at 90-92; Meyer, supra note 248, at 671-72.
273. See Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1521,
1535-36 (1993); see also Tobias, supra note 198, at 751. See generally WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994).
274. See Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr., Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of
1980, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 523, 526-28; Ginsburg, supra note 250, at 10-11.
275. BAKER, supra note 25, at 202.
276. See Irving R. Kaufman, New Remedies for the Next Century of Judicial Reform: Time
as the Greatest Innovator, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 253, 258 (1988); see also Baker, supra note
6, at 948. But see Richman & Reynolds, supra note 221, at 304-07 (noting that the cost of
additional judges must be considered in the broader context of the entire federal budget).
277. See Gerald B. Tjoftat, More Judges, Less Justice, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 70, 73; Jon
0. Newman, 1,000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 187,
188 (1993). But see Reinhardt, supra note 231. See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL.,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES:
ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS (1993).
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A concomitant of the option above is the division of regional circuits
because these two alternatives have comprised the preferred solution
historically employed by Congress. Splitting appeals courts is a limited
reform that has apparently become outmoded. Most important, division
affords no systemic benefit because, for instance, it only redistributes
the workload and requires the appellate courts to resolve the identical
number of appeals.278
A related, but potentially more productive, option would be
enhancement of the non-judicial resources that regional circuits have to
resolve their burgeoning dockets. Examples are increases in the number
of staff attorneys, judicial law clerks, and other court administrative and
technical personnel. The devotion of these resources has apparently
preserved judges' time and effort and improved operations by, for
example, enabling circuits to expedite case dispositions. However, this
solution could impose the disadvantages entailed in greater bureaucratization.279
Specialized appellate courts afford another possibility. "Court
specialization holds out the promise of deepening expertise, uniformity
and stability, as judges become more experienced and encounter the full
dimension of their subject matter."280 Nonetheless, numerous observers
have criticized increased reliance on these tribunals for several reasons
that principally implicate the threat which they would pose to the
tradition of generalist judges.281 Illustrative are assertions that the
courts' judges would develop overly narrow viewpoints, the tribunals
would promulgate balkanizing procedures, and limited subject matter
jurisdiction could enable special interests to influence unduly a legal
field. 282
iv. Proposed External Reforms
Some study groups, including the Judicial Conference, the ABA and
the FJC, and numerous other evaluators have assessed a number of
external reforms that the appellate courts could effectuate. The regional
circuits have implemented relatively few of these alternatives, particular278. See supra notes 223-25; infra text accompanying note 309.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 200, 212, 235.
280. BAKER, supra note 25, at 222.
281. See Ben F. Overton, A Prescription for the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 205, 221-22 (1984); see also Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with
Fire.fighters: A Proposal for Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1993).
282. See Simon Rifldnd, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a
Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425, 425-26 (1951); see also BAKER, supra note 25, at 222.
For more discussion of these reforms, see BAKER, supra note 25, at 186-228; MCKENNA, supra
note 32, at 141-54.
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ly those that are structural, although several courts have applied certain
measures principally for purposes of experimentation.
The Federal Courts Study Committee did not endorse, but explored
and urged greater analysis of, five possibilities. The first suggestion was
that Congress periodically redraw appeals court boundaries to establish
regional circuits of nine judges and that the current system be dissolved.283 The approach would afford the benefits, especially collegiality, that courts with smaller judicial complements purportedly enjoy, but
initial implementation could prove disruptive and subsequent effectuation might foster intercircuit conflicts and undercut the appeals courts•
federalizing role. 284 A second recommendation called for the creation
of another appellate tier between the Supreme Court and the district
courts.285 This proposal is premised on assumptions that the Justices
confront an onerous workload which threatens their performance and
that the federal courts' existing structure lacks adequate capacity to
maintain sufficient consistency in national law.286 Each proposition is
controversial, while Congress and the judiciary seem unlikely to
implement an additional tier until they agree on the need for it and on
an appropriate design.287
A third idea was the establishment of new national subject matter
appeals courts in areas such as admiralty, civil rights and labor.288 This
alternative offers specialization's advantages, namely expertise,
efficiency, and greater uniformity in the designated field of federal law,
but it contravenes the traditional notion of generalist judges because
each court would have a narrow focus and might be vulnerable to
capture.289 A few regional circuits have experimented with~ subject
matter panels in various substantive areas, including oil and gas law,

283. See REPOIU OF THE FEDERAL COUIUS STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 118-19.
See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at 239-42.
284. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 228; Baker, supra note 6, at 946.
285. See REPOIU OF THE FEDERAL COUIUS STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 119-20.
See generally BAKER, supra note 25, at 242-61.
286. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1400-01 (1987); Robert L. Stern, Remedies for Appellate Overloads:
The Ultimate Solution, 72 JUDICATURE 103, 103-04 (1988).
287. See, e.g., James A. Gazell, The National Court ofAppeals Controversy: An Emerging
Negative Consensus, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1986); Note, Of High Designs: A
Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REV.
307, 310-18 (1983).
288. See REPOIU OF THE FEDERAL COUIUS STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at 120-21;
see also supra text accompanying notes 279-81 (exploring specialized appeals courts).
289. See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Refonns or Efforts to
Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 217 (1991); LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34,
at 43 (Recommendation Sixteen).
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which has enabled the courts to develop particularized expertise and
realize certain economies.290 The Ninth Circuit successfully has
employed Bankruptcy Appellate Panels that essentially embody this
concept and correspondingly save the court's judicial resources.291
The fourth proposal suggested the merger and reconfiguration of all
present regfonal circuits into a single, centrally-organized entity.292 The
option would provide certain efficiencies; however, initial institution
could be disruptive and consequent implementation might be difficult to
administer. The last recommendation was the consolidation of the
existing appellate courts into approximately five "jumbo" circuits with
larger judicial complements.293 This possibility would provide several
benefits-such as diversity and some economies-that larger appeals
courts have secured, although numerous observers, including judges,
have criticized the approach because it could sacrifice collegiality and
might erode consistency.294
There are other alternatives that the Federal Courts Study Committee
did not consider. One would place responsibility for error correction in
three-judge district courts with certiorari jurisdiction in three-judge
appellate panels, thereby capitalizing on district courts' larger judicial
capacity.295 This idea would save appeals court resources, but the
concept might necessitate an increase in the coq>s of district judges and
it would impose substantial appellate responsibilities on these judicial
officers, many of whom were appointed ostensibly because they
possessed the expertise and temperament required for trial court
service.296 Moreover, Congress and the judiciary could formally
290. See, e.g., REPORI' OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITIEE, supra note 26, at
120-21. See generally Stuart S. Nagel, Systematic Assignment of Judges: A Proposal, 70
JUDICATURE 73 (1986).
291. See Michael A. Berch, The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and Its Implications for
Adoption of Specialist Panels in the Courts ofAppeals, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE, supra note
208, at 65-91; see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1994) (prescribing panels for all appeals courts).
292. See REPORI' OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 121; see
also J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for
a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913, 940-41 (1983).
293. See REPORI' OF THE FEDERAL COURI'S STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 26, at 122-23.
The existing circuits could be differently reconfigured or specific states, such as those in the
Ninth Circuit, might be reassigned to courts, namely the Eighth or Tenth Circuits, other than
those in which they are now situated. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 236-37; see
also Carl Tobias, Why Congress Should Not Split the Ninth Circuit, 50 SMU L. REV. 583, 596
(1997).
294. See, e.g., J. Clifford Wallace, The Case for Large Federal Courts of Appeals, 77
JUDICATURE 288, 288 (1994); Newman, supra note 277, at 187-88 (noting dangers of a large
federal judiciary).
295. See LoNG RANGE PLAN, supra note 34, at 131-32.
296. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1401-02 (exploring related ways of assigning appellate
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recognize the notion of discretionary review that the regional circuits
may have already implemented de facto through devices, such as
limitations on oral arguments and on written dispositions and enhanced
reliance on staff, although discretionary review might not be constitutional and would substantially modify the appeal of right, which has a
lengthy, rich history.297
b. Ninth Circuit
Assuming that the commission will definitively determine that the
Ninth Circuit does or will experience complications that are so
problematic as to warrant treatment, it should assiduously explore the
broadest feasible spectrum of potential solutions for addressing those
difficulties. The most vexing issues that the entity must resolve are
whether the many measures that the court has applied or might employ
in the future will suffice, and if they will not, whether options that
implicate Ninth Circuit realignment would improve the present or future
circumstances of the court and the appellate system enough to justify
implementation. It is impossible to predict exactly how the commission
will answer these questions until the entity has comprehensively studied
the relevant complications and applicable remedies. Nonetheless, some
guidance can be afforded.
i. The Efficacy of Approaches that the Ninth Circuit
Has Applied or Might Employ

The commission should first carefully scrutinize all of the approaches
which the Ninth Circuit has effectuated or could use. The court has
adopted, tested, or received most of the aforementioned past and present,
and numerous proposed, internal and external reforms.298 The Ninth
Circuit has been a leader in developing and employing innovative
mechanisms to treat the problems that it faces and that the other eleven
appellate courts confront. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has enthusiastically experimented with, and beneficially exploited, measures that the
remaining appeals courts have invented or instituted.

functions to district judges and reaching similar conclusions regarding efficacy); Tobias, supra
note 200, at 403-04.
297. See BAKER, supra note 25, at 234-38; Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr.,

Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting Discretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has
Arrived, 50 SMU L. REV. 573, 578-82 (1997); Tobias, supra note 7, at 1402-03; see also supra
text accompanying notes 229-30. For more discussion of external reforms, see BAKER, supra
note 25, at 229-86.
298. See supra text accompanying notes 228-96.
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The Ninth Circuit also has relied upon certain alternatives that few
courts have applied. Prominent illustrations are the administrative units,
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, and the limited en bane technique, the last
of which deserves special attention because the mechanism's efficacy is
critical to the future of the Ninth Circuit and of the large appeals
courts.299 The Ninth Circuit correspondingly depends on an executive
committee, which evaluates court operating procedures and makes
proposals for their improvement to the entire circuit and which has
authority to act between the court's regular meetings, during emergencies, and on less important matters.300 The Ninth Circuit concomitantly
has implemented a special track for easily-concluded or less complex
appeals that are submitted without oral argument. 301 Moreover, court
staff review all briefs and identify similar issues so that the circuit might
consider them together and avoid conflicts, and staff conduct prebriefing
conferences to clarify and narrow the issues for resolution and to
explore settlement prospects.302 Furthermore, the court's enormous
caseload has required it to maintain a substantially larger complement
of judges than any other circuit and prompted the Judicial Conference
to recommend that Congress authorize ten new judgeships for the
court.303 Much information now suggests, and the commission may
determine, that the apparent efficacy of most non-structural solutions
that the Ninth Circuit has employed as well as its longstanding and
future willingness to invent and test novel concepts and to experiment
with and adopt nascent alternatives that additional courts create or study
groups or writers propose will suffice.
ii. The Efficacy of Structural Approaches
for the Ninth Circuit
If the commission conclusively finds these measures to be deficient,
numerous ideas indicate that structural approaches might not be
efficacious enough to deserve implementation. First, reconfiguration
would be disruptive for several reasons that not only implicate the
generic adverse effects on precedent and judicial administration
mentioned above304 but also that pertain more specifically to the Ninth
Circuit. For example, the court's division could lead to inconsistent

See supra text accompanying notes 42-45, 290.
See BAKER, supra note 25, at 79.
See id. at 82; see also supra text accompanying notes 44-45.
See supra text accompanying notes 44, 68.
The court has applied many additional measures, most of which I alluded to earlier.
See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 4.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
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application of business, maritime, and utility law in each new circuit on
the West Coast, complicating commerce and requiring parties to
research the precedent of multiple courts for any potential cross-circuit
transaction.305 Splitting the court might correspondingly fragment the
unified construction of federal laws governing natural resources and
other fields that the circuit has consistently applied across the West.306
The court's bifurcation also may encourage forum shopping between the
two appellate tribunals. 307 Even if realignment were less drastic and
disruptive, as well as more effective, California's substantial population
and caseload mean that the Ninth Circuit defies practical division; no
felicitous way of restructuring the court has yet been devised.308 These
difficulties, accordingly, show that the commission should not seriously
consider reconfiguration until the entity has meticulously scrutinized a
broad spectrum of less disruptive, and ostensibly more promising,
possibilities and clearly concluded that they are inadequate.309

iii. The Systemic Efficacy of Structural
Approaches for the Ninth Circuit
Should the commission definitively determine that realignment of the
Ninth Circuit is in the court's best interest, the entity must carefully
consider whether restructuring is superior for the entire appellate system.
Several ideas which complement the general complications relating to
precedent and judicial administration,310 suggest that division would be
inadvisable. An important reason why reconfiguration is inappropriate
is that Ninth Circuit bifurcation would afford virtually no systemic
benefit.311 Splitting the court fails to remedy any significant problems
305. See SECONDS. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 5-6.
306. See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 49, at 286 (statement of Sen. Wilson); id. at 508
(statement of Michael Traynor). Division also could increase the fragmentation of federal law
more generally. See supra text accompanying note 283.
307. See SECOND S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 77, at 3. Division would require
duplicative personnel, administration and courthouses and reduce the court's federalizing
function and diversity. See id.; supra notes 78, 218-19 and accompanying text; see also infra
notes 310-12 and accompanying text (affording more reasons why division is inadvisable).
308. See infra text accompanying notes 313, 317-21.
309. See supra text accompanying note 224 (recommending realignment "only when
compelling empirical evidence demonstrates" adjudicative or administrative disfunction in a
court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent, consistent circuit law in
the face of increasing workload.). The court has invented or used many effective non-structural
options which have apparently resolved its major problems.
310. See supra text accompanying notes 223-25.
311. See Baker, supra note 6, at 945-49; see also Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth
Circuit-No Answer to Caseload Growth, OR. ST. B. BULL., Jan. 1990, at 10, 11; Tobias, supra
note 7, at 1386-90.
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that the circuit might be experiencing; division would simply defer
resolution of two courts' difficulties. Distributing the current docket
among multiple circuits will merely shift, rather than reduce, the
workload. The total quantity of cases decided would remain identical,
despite the number of courts that address the appeals. In short,
bifurcating the Ninth Circuit today would minimally improve the
appellate system.
The Ninth Circuit also has been, and will probably continue to be,
the exemplar for most, but especially for the large, appeals courts. For
instance, it has been the acknowledged leader in developing and
applying creative measures to treat the complications that many regional
circuits do and will confront. Thus, were the Ninth Circuit restructured,
the appellate system would lose the preeminent appeals court for
experimenting with salutary solutions to these problems.312 Splitting
the Ninth Circuit could correspondingly be inadvisable because division
effectively would eliminate a primary candidate for designation as, or
inclusion in, a jumbo appellate court, should this approach be deemed
superior.313 Moreover, Ninth Circuit reconfiguration may prove irrevocable because it might foreclose implementation of potentially efficacious alternatives, such as combining the twelve regional appeals courts
into fewer jumbo circuits.314 The above examination, therefore, indicates that Ninth Circuit realignment would not be best for the appellate
system.
iv. Analysis of Structural Approaches
If the commission conclusively decides that the finest solution for the
Ninth Circuit and al) of the appeals courts is restructuring the present
Ninth Circuit, the entity should determine which reconfiguration is
superior by consulting the numerous options that are available. The
logical starting point would be the various approaches that Congress has
examined over the years when considering realignment. It is important
to remember that senators and representatives have adopted none of the
proposals proffered partly because the court resists practical restructur312. See Mary M. Schroeder, Jim Browning as a Leader of Judges: A View from a
Follower, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 7 (1989) (quoting Chief Judge James R. Browning).
313. If Congress adopts any proposals for dividing the Ninth Circuit that it has seriously
considered, the court may well remain large, and this could dilute my ideas' force.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 253, 311. These problems indicate that the
commission should only seriously evaluate realignment once it has exhausted many, less
dramatic and disruptive, and more promising, prospects. Ideas in this paragraph will have more
future importance if caseload growth and congressional and judicial inaction essentially continue
so that the other circuits increasingly resemble the Ninth Circuit See supra text accompanying
note 226.
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ing. This situation can be ascribed substantially to the California
conundrum. The state is responsible for more than a majority of Ninth
Circuit cases, and the only effective way to treat California is by
creating a one-state appellate court or by dividing California and
assigning some of its four federal districts to different appeals courts;
both prospects are essentially unprecedented and would impose
disadvantages.315
The most general possibilities for reconfiguring the· Ninth Circuit
include trifurcation and bifurcation. Fashioning three appellate courts
warrants limited evaluation because the commission will probably find
that this potential remedy is comparatively ineffective. For example, the
insufficiently large caseload and certain administrative and political
realities, including the expense and replication of management structures
seemingly make trifurcation infeasible, although a few senators did
allude to the idea during the July 1997 floor debate.316
Some observers have advanced and analyzed numerous methods of
bifurcating the Ninth Circuit. One prominent illustration is the establishment of a new appeals court comprising the five states of the Pacific
Northwest, although this alternative would unequally apportion the
current docket. 317 A related, recent proposal would add Arizona to
these jurisdictions, but the approach fails to cure the imbalanced case
distribution or to honor the notion of contiguity, which the Hruska
Commission posited as an important criterion for creating appellate
courts.318
Additional options frontally attack the problems, particularly
implicating appeals, that California's great magnitude imposes. One
controversial suggestion would divide the state and place certain of its
districts in a specific regional circuit and the remainder in another.319
The potential for each appellate court to interpret California law
differently might prove troubling.320 The Hruska Commission and a
few writers have deemphasized the significance of possible conflicts
partly because a similar situation presently obtains in the regional circuits.321 Nonetheless, the prospect of splitting California has engendered relatively limited support.
315. See infra text accompanying notes 317-21.
316. See, e.g., 143 CONG. REc. 88041, 88044 (daily ed. July 24, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Gorton).
317. See S. 948, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1990); S. 956, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995); see
also supra text accompanying notes 47-84.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 21, 57-58.
319. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 238-39; see also supra text accompanying
note 24.
320. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 238-39.
321. See id.; see also Hellman, supra note 24, at 1281.
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A second alternative that similarly attempts to allocate the docket
more evenly would be an appeals court which consists exclusively or
essentially of California. The Hruska Commission found that a one-state
circuit could lack the diversity which judges who have practiced and
lived in different states afford. 322 The entity expressed concern that a
lone senator who served multiple terms and was actively involved in
judicial appointments might shape a court for an entire generation.323
These disadvantages mean that this approach has received little serious
consideration.
It also would be possible to reconfigure the Ninth Circuit by
transferring states that are currently included in the court to other
regional circuits, namely the Eighth or Tenth Circuits. For example,
some observers have periodically entertained the idea of moving Arizona
to the Tenth Circuit, and a few senators broached that proposition as
recently as 1995.324 A related option might be the establishment of an
appellate court comprising the states of the intermountain West, which
are presently situated in the Ninth and Tenth Circuits.325 Those alternatives have secured minimal support because they apparently have been
deemed quite unconventional.
In the final analysis, the existing Ninth Circuit seemingly defies
feasible realignment. Much information now suggests, and the commission may well find, that the preferable approach would be to leave the
court as currently constituted and attempt to improve it through
continued application of the many effective mechanisms that the circuit
has employed and through implementation of numerous efficacious
measures that other courts have used or that study groups or writers
have suggested. The ideal mix of reforms cannot be conclusively
identified until the entity has completed its evaluation; however, I can
proffer some guidance.
Devices, such as administrative units, Bankruptcy Appellate Panels,
and computerized issue coding, that clearly have been beneficial deserve
ongoing use. 326 Options, including the limited en bane procedure and
substantial reliance on staff, that have yielded unclear, and even
controversial, results,327 and alternatives, such as the appellate commissioner,328 that appear promising probably warrant continued employ322. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 237. The commission characterized this
attribute as a "highly desirable, and perhaps essential, condition" for creating circuits. See id.;
see also supra text accompanying notes 65, 218, 293.
323. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 237.
324. See id. at 236-37; supra note 124.
325. See HRUSKA COMMISSION, supra note 2, at 236-37; Tobias, supra note 293, at 596.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 42, 68, 290.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 43-45, 300-01.
328. See supra text accompanying note 254.
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ment or experimentation with close assessment of their effectiveness.
The commission's examination also should clarify the efficacy of
various techniques that the regional appellate courts and the Ninth
Circuit have applied.329
An important set of actions that Congress and President Clinton
could implement in the near term involves the infusion of resources.
One significant form that this activity might assume is the expeditious
appointment of judges for the Ninth Circuit's ten vacancies. Another is
seriously considering authorization of the nine new judgeships recommended by the Judicial Conference. Congress correspondingly could
approve more non-judicial personnel for the court. These increased
resources would be responsive to concerns regarding the time that the
Ninth Circuit consumes in deciding appeals; however, additional judges
and staff may impose certain disadvantages, such as intracircuit
inconsistency and greater bureaucratization.330
If the commission definitively concludes that the Ninth Circuit must
be restructured, the entity should assess the potential reconfigurations
canvassed above, and any new realignments that it can develop, in light
of several criteria. One helpful group of standards is the factors that the
Hruska Commission articulated a quarter century ago, most of which
have much continuing validity.331 For example, the ideas that appeals
courts should be comprised of at least three contiguous states and ought
to include jurisdictions with diverse populations, legal business, and
socioeconomic interests retain considerable vitality today. The commission also must attempt to divide the caseload evenly between the
proposed courts and to allocate judgeships in a manner that affords each
new regional circuit sufficient members to ensure the prompt, fair,
inexpensive, and consistent resolution of appeals.332
III. CONCLUSION
Congress recently authorized a Commission on Structural Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals. This entity must capitalize on
its valuable opportunity to analyze comprehensively the regional circuits
and formulate constructive recommendations that will enable the courts
to treat the crisis of volume. If the commission systematically evaluates
the problems that the regional circuits do and will face and efficacious
remedies to these difficulties, the courts should be able to solve the
complications that they will confront in the next century.
329. The Ninth Circuit also may want to review measures which other courts have
successfully applied or which study groups or writers have proposed, and this survey could
reveal mechanisms that the Ninth Circuit might profitably implement or test.
330. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 273-78.
331. See supra note 21.
332. See Tobias, supra note 7, at 1410-11; Tobias, supra note 293, at 600.

